1. Jurisdiction of court

2. Appeal of order

3. Termination of parental rights

4. Rehabilitation plan

5. Placement with Department of Health and Human Services

6. Presence of child

7. Evidence

8. Abused or neglected child

9. Miscellaneous

1. Jurisdiction of court

The purpose of the adjudication phase is to protect the interests of the child. The parents' rights are determined at the dispositional phase, not at the adjudication phase. At the adjudication stage, in order for a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of minor children under subdivision (3)(a) of this section, the State must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Interest of Xandria P., 311 Neb. 591, 973 N.W.2d 692 (2022).

Pursuant to subdivision (12) of this section, whether a juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person is determined not by the person's age at the time of the offense, but, rather, by the person's age at the time he or she is charged for the offense. State v. Pauly, 311 Neb. 418, 972 N.W.2d 907 (2022).

At the adjudication stage, pursuant to subdivision (3)(a) of this section, in order for a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of minor children, the State must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Interest of Prince R., 308 Neb. 415, 954 N.W.2d 294 (2021).

To obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile at the adjudication stage, the court's only concern is whether the conditions in which the juvenile presently finds himself or herself fit within the asserted subdivision of this section. In re Interest of Prince R., 308 Neb. 415, 954 N.W.2d 294 (2021).

To obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile and the juvenile's parents, the court's only concern is whether the condition in which the juvenile presently finds himself or herself fits within the asserted subdivision of this section. In re Interest of A.A. et al., 307 Neb. 817, 951 N.W.2d 144 (2020).

Under the former law, a juvenile’s noncompliance with the compulsory education statutes, found in chapter 79 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, without being first excused by school authorities established truancy and granted the juvenile court jurisdiction under subdivision (3)(b) of this section. In re Interest of Samantha C., 287 Neb. 644, 843 N.W.2d 665 (2014).

Neither domicile of the minor child’s parents nor birth of the child in the state is sufficient to provide subject matter jurisdiction under subsection (3) of this section when the minor child is not found within the state’s borders and has never resided here. In re Interest of Violet T., 286 Neb. 949, 840 N.W.2d 459 (2013).

Under the former subdivision (11) of this section, a juvenile court cannot acquire jurisdiction over a custody determination unless a party has previously filed a complaint for a dissolution or a custody modification in district court. Molczyk v. Molczyk, 285 Neb. 96, 825 N.W.2d 435 (2013).

Under section 43-285(2), once a child has been adjudicated under subsection (3) of this section, the juvenile court ultimately decides where a child should be placed. In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581, 811 N.W.2d 214 (2012).

Under this section, when a juvenile has been charged with a felony, the district court and the juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction of the juvenile court ends when the individual reaches the age of majority, while the district court's jurisdiction continues. State v. Parks, 282 Neb. 454, 803 N.W.2d 761 (2011).

Absent any provision affirmatively stating otherwise, it is within the juvenile court's discretion to issue whatever combination of statutorily authorized dispositions as the court deems necessary to protect the juvenile's best interests. In re Interest of Katrina R., 281 Neb. 907, 799 N.W.2d 673 (2011).

It is within the juvenile court's statutory power to issue a dispositional order for juveniles adjudicated under subsection (3)(b) of this section, which includes both legal custody with the Department of Health and Human Services and supervision by a probation officer. In re Interest of Katrina R., 281 Neb. 907, 799 N.W.2d 673 (2011).

Under this section and section 43-408(2), a juvenile court has jurisdiction over an adjudicated juvenile whom the court has placed at a youth rehabilitation and treatment center. But despite that jurisdiction, section 43-408(2) prohibits a juvenile court from reviewing the progress of a juvenile whom the court has placed at a youth rehabilitation and treatment center. In re Interest of Trey H., 281 Neb. 760, 798 N.W.2d 607 (2011).

When a court adjudicates a juvenile under both subsections (2) and (3) of this section and commits the juvenile to the Office of Juvenile Services with a placement at a youth rehabilitation and treatment center, it has determined that the subsection (2) adjudication will control the juvenile's disposition. The disposition determination controls which review hearing statute applies, and the requirement in section 43-278 for 6-month review hearings does not authorize the court to conduct review hearings. In re Interest of Trey H., 281 Neb. 760, 798 N.W.2d 607 (2011).

To obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile, the court's only concern is whether the conditions in which the juvenile presently finds himself or herself fit within the asserted subsection of this section. In re Interest of Angelica L. & Daniel L., 277 Neb. 984, 767 N.W.2d 74 (2009).

Where a juvenile is adjudicated solely on the basis of habitual truancy from school under subsection (3)(b) of this section and the status of truancy is subsequently terminated by the lawful execution of a parental release authorizing discontinuation of school pursuant to subsection (3)(d) of section 79-201, a juvenile court may terminate its jurisdiction without a finding that such termination is in the best interests of the juvenile. In re Interest of Kevin K., 274 Neb. 678, 742 N.W.2d 767 (2007).

Subject matter jurisdiction is vested in the juvenile court by an adjudication that a child is a juvenile described in subsection (3)(a) of this section, and pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, the juvenile court's jurisdiction is extended to parents who have custody of any juvenile who has been found to be a child described in this section. In re Interest of Devin W. et al., 270 Neb. 640, 707 N.W.2d 758 (2005).

In order for a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of minor children under subsection (3)(a) of this section, the State must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. The court's only concern is whether the conditions in which the juvenile presently finds himself or herself fit within the asserted subsection of this section. In re Interest of Corey P. et al., 269 Neb. 925, 697 N.W.2d 647 (2005).

When a juvenile court has obtained exclusive jurisdiction over a minor under this section, the district court lacks jurisdiction to hear an action seeking grandparent visitation. Ponseigo v. Mary W., 267 Neb. 72, 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003).

The Legislature intended that the issue of reasonable efforts required under section 43-283.01 must be reviewed by the juvenile court (1) when removing from the home a juvenile adjudged to be under subsections (3) or (4) of this section pursuant to section 43-284, (2) when the court continues a juvenile's out-of-home placement pending adjudication pursuant to section 43-254, (3) when the court reviews a juvenile's status and permanency planning pursuant to section 43-1315, and (4) when termination of parental rights to a juvenile is sought by the State under subsection (6) of section 43-292. In re Interest of DeWayne G., Jr. & Devon G., 263 Neb. 43, 638 N.W.2d 510 (2002).

A county court's jurisdiction over a previously established guardianship must yield to the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction over a minor and his or her guardian if the juvenile court determines that there is a sufficient factual basis for an adjudication under this section. In re Interest of Sabrina K., 262 Neb. 871, 635 N.W.2d 727 (2001).

Under this section, once a minor is adjudged to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the juvenile court shall have exclusive jurisdiction as to any such juvenile and as to the parent, guardian, or custodian who has custody of any juvenile described within this section. In re Guardianship of Rebecca B. et al., 260 Neb. 922, 621 N.W.2d 289 (2000); In re Interest of Miah T. & DeKandyce H., 23 Neb. App. 592, 875 N.W.2d 1 (2016).

When a minor is adjudged to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, a guardianship appointment must be made pursuant to the juvenile code. In re Guardianship of Rebecca B. et al., 260 Neb. 922, 621 N.W.2d 289 (2000).

Proof of venue is immaterial to the determination of whether a juvenile falls within the meaning of this section. In re Interest of Leo L. II, 258 Neb. 877, 606 N.W.2d 783 (2000).

The plain language of subsection (6) of this section states that the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction of the proceedings for termination of parental rights as provided in the Nebraska Juvenile Code. Subsection (6) of this section and section 43-291 indicate that the juvenile court may properly acquire jurisdiction over an original action to terminate parental rights as provided in the Nebraska Juvenile Code without prior juvenile court action, including adjudication. In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 256 Neb. 596, 591 N.W.2d 557 (1999).

Subsection (3)(b) of this section does not give a juvenile court the power to interfere with a parent's rights over a nonadjudicated child. In re Interest of D.W., 249 Neb. 133, 542 N.W.2d 407 (1996).

The trial court did not err in basing a finding of juvenile court jurisdiction upon the father's two prior convictions for committing sex crimes against children, his lack of treatment for his sexual disorder, and upon the mother's inability to prevent unsupervised contact between the father and the children, even though no evidence of inappropriate contact by the father with the children existed. In re Interest of M.B. and A.B., 239 Neb. 1028, 480 N.W.2d 160 (1992).

Verification of a petition alleging a child to be a juvenile within subsection (3)(a) of this section is not required to vest jurisdiction in a juvenile court. In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249, 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986).

The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction as to a child who is habitually truant from school, regardless of whether the reason for truancy is an act of the child or parent. The cause of the truancy is insignificant. In re Interest of K.S., 216 Neb. 926, 346 N.W.2d 417 (1984).

Prior to adjudicating a child under this section, a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction over the juvenile's parents, guardians, or custodians. In re Interest of Marquee N., 30 Neb. App. 862, 974 N.W.2d 26 (2022).

At the adjudication stage, in order for a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of a minor child, the State must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court's only concern is whether the conditions in which the juvenile presently finds himself or herself fit within the asserted subsection of this section. In re Interest of Darius A., 24 Neb. App. 178, 884 N.W.2d 457 (2016).

This section grants to the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction as to any juvenile defined in subsection (3) and, under subsection (5), jurisdiction over the parent, guardian, or custodian who has custody of such juvenile. In re Interest of Trenton W. et al., 22 Neb. App. 976, 865 N.W.2d 804 (2015).

The juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction as to the parties and proceedings provided in subsections (5), (6), and (8) of this section. In re Interest of Jordana H. et al., 22 Neb. App. 19, 846 N.W.2d 686 (2014).

At the adjudication stage, in order for a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of a minor child under subsection (3)(a) of this section, the State must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court's only concern is whether the conditions in which the juvenile presently finds himself or herself fit within the asserted subsection of this section. In re Interest of Laticia S., 21 Neb. App. 921, 844 N.W.2d 841 (2014).

Subsection (9) of this section provides the juvenile court jurisdiction over the guardianship proceedings of a juvenile described elsewhere within the code. In re Interest of Brianna B., 21 Neb. App. 657, 842 N.W.2d 191 (2014).

Subsection (3)(a) of this section provides that the juvenile court in each county shall have jurisdiction over any juvenile who lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. In re Interest of Tegan V., 18 Neb. App. 857, 794 N.W.2d 190 (2011).

This section gives the juvenile courts exclusive original jurisdiction as to any juvenile defined in subsection (3) of this section. In re Interest of Tegan V., 18 Neb. App. 857, 794 N.W.2d 190 (2011).

This section, combined with sections 24-517 and 25-2740, vests juvenile courts and county courts sitting as juvenile courts with jurisdiction over a custody modification proceeding if the court already has jurisdiction over the juvenile under a separate provision of this section. In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63, 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009).

Pursuant to subdivision (10) of this section and section 30-2608(e), guardianship was properly docketed in the county court and heard by a separate juvenile court judge. In re Guardianship of Brenda B. et al., 13 Neb. App. 618, 698 N.W.2d 228 (2005).

Pursuant to subdivision (5) of this section, the juvenile court does not obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile's parent, guardian, or custodian until a finding of adjudication. In re Interest of Meley P., 13 Neb. App. 195, 689 N.W.2d 875 (2004).

Under subsection (3)(a) of this section, the juvenile court continues to have jurisdiction over adjudicated children, either until their age of majority or until they become adopted, and until such time, the court has the authority to enter orders that are in the best interests of the children. In re Interest of Stacey D. & Shannon D., 12 Neb. App. 707, 684 N.W.2d 594 (2004).

Only the county attorney can initiate proceedings in juvenile court under subsections (1) through (4) of this section. In re Interest of Valentin V., 12 Neb. App. 390, 674 N.W.2d 793 (2004).

Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the juvenile court has jurisdiction of any juvenile who has committed an act other than a traffic offense which would constitute a misdemeanor or an infraction under the laws of this state. In re Interest of Steven K., 11 Neb. App. 828, 661 N.W.2d 320 (2003).

A juvenile court's commitment of a juvenile to a youth rehabilitation treatment center does not constitute a discharge within the meaning of this section, and therefore, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction. In re Interest of David C., 6 Neb. App. 198, 572 N.W.2d 392 (1997).

When a minor has been adjudicated a juvenile as defined under subsection (3) of this section and the juvenile court retains jurisdiction, a probate court cannot appoint a guardian of that juvenile without the consent of the juvenile court. In re Guardianship of Alice D. et al., 4 Neb. App. 726, 548 N.W.2d 18 (1996).

Jurisdiction of a juvenile court under subsection (3)(a) of this section is dependent upon whether the child is in need of care at the commencement of the proceedings and not on whether a parent is allowed to participate in the proceedings. In re Interest of Amanda H., 4 Neb. App. 293, 542 N.W.2d 79 (1996).

2. Appeal of order

An order changing a permanency plan in a juvenile case adjudicated under subdivision (3)(a) of this section does not necessarily affect a substantial right of the parent for purposes of the final order statute, section 25-1902, when the order continues prior orders directed at family preservation and reunification or remedying the reasons that led to the adjudication. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).

In a juvenile case adjudicated under subsection (3)(a) of this section, an order that continues prior dispositional orders but changes the permanency objective from family reunification to another objective, is a final, appealable order under the final order statute, section 25-1902, only if the parent's ability to achieve rehabilitation and family reunification has been clearly eliminated, because such an order affects a substantial right. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).

Subsequent review orders in a juvenile case adjudicated under subdivision (3)(a) of this section do not typically affect a substantial right for purposes of appeal under the final order statute, section 25-1902, because the parent has been given the full and fair opportunity to respond to the allegations at the adjudication stage. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).

A judicial determination made following an adjudication in a special proceeding which affects the substantial right of parents to raise their children is a final, appealable order. In re Interest of Ty M. & Devon M., 265 Neb. 150, 655 N.W.2d 672 (2003).

A dispositional order in which a juvenile court declines to order a rehabilitation plan for parents of a child adjudicated under subsection (3)(a) of this section is a final, appealable order. A juvenile court is not required to order or implement a rehabilitation plan for the parent of a child adjudicated under subsection (3)(a) of this section if the plan has very little chance of success and is not in the best interests of the child. Where a child's substantial medical needs resulting from injury caused by parental abuse necessitated 24-hour daily nursing care for the child, the juvenile court did not err in accepting recommendation of the Department of Health and Human Services that no rehabilitation plan be implemented to reunite a child with his or her parents. In re Interest of Tabatha R., 255 Neb. 818, 587 N.W.2d 109 (1998).

A detention order issued under subsection (3)(a) of this section and section 43-254 after a hearing which continues to withhold the custody of a juvenile from the parent pending an adjudication hearing to determine whether the juvenile is neglected is a final order and thus appealable. Thus, where an appeal from such an order has been perfected, a trial court is without jurisdiction to terminate parental rights until resolution of the parent's appeal from the original detention order regarding that child. In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 251 Neb. 614, 558 N.W.2d 548 (1997).

Proceedings under this section are reviewed de novo on the record, and the appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the trial court's finding; however, where the evidence is in conflict, the appellate court will consider and may give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over another. After a determination pursuant to this section that juveniles are within subsection (3)(a) of this section, and before entering an order containing a rehabilitative plan for a parent, the juvenile court shall inform the parent that the court may order such a plan, and shall hold a hearing and make findings on the record to determine reasonable provisions material to the plan's rehabilitative object of correcting, eliminating, or ameliorating the situation or condition upon which the adjudication was based. In re Interest of L.P. and R.P., 240 Neb. 112, 480 N.W.2d 421 (1992).

An ex parte temporary detention order keeping a juvenile's custody from his or her parent for a short period of time pending a hearing as to whether the detention should be continued is not final; however, a detention order entered after a hearing continuing to keep a juvenile's custody from his or her parent pending an adjudication hearing to determine whether the juvenile is neglected, and thus within the purview of subsection (3)(a) of this section, is final and thus appealable. In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991).

An order finding a child to be a juvenile as described in subsection (3)(a) of this section is an adjudication order, which is an appealable order. Notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days from the rendition of the judgment; after expiration of the 30 days, the order may not be reviewed. In re Interest of Z.R., 226 Neb. 770, 415 N.W.2d 128 (1987).

The standard of review applicable to a juvenile proceeding under this section is de novo on the record. In re Interest of R.A. and V.A., 225 Neb. 157, 403 N.W.2d 357 (1987).

Although an ex parte temporary detention order keeping a juvenile's custody from his or her parent for a short period of time is not final, an order under section 43-254 and subsection (3)(a) of this section after a hearing which continues to keep a juvenile's custody from the parent pending an adjudication hearing is final and thus appealable. In re Interest of Stephanie H. et al., 10 Neb. App. 908, 639 N.W.2d 668 (2002).

Pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section, an order changing the placement of a juvenile who has been adjudicated under this section affects a substantial right of the State and is a final and appealable order. In re Interest of Tanisha P. et al., 9 Neb. App. 344, 611 N.W.2d 418 (2000).

An adjudication under this section of the Nebraska Juvenile Code is an appealable order. In re Interest of Simon H., 8 Neb. App. 225, 590 N.W.2d 421 (1999).

Although an ex parte temporary detention order keeping a juvenile's custody from his or her parent for a short period of time is not final, one entered under this section, after a hearing which continues to keep a juvenile's custody from the parent pending an adjudication hearing to determine whether the juvenile is neglected, is final and thus appealable. In re Interest of Cassandra L. & Trevor L., 4 Neb. App. 333, 543 N.W.2d 199 (1996).

3. Termination of parental rights

When a court knows that a parent is incarcerated or confined nearby, it should take steps, without request, to afford the parent due process before adjudicating a child or terminating the parent’s parental rights. In re Interest of Landon H., 287 Neb. 105, 841 N.W.2d 369 (2013).

Where a juvenile has been adjudicated pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section and a permanency objective of adoption has been established, a juvenile court has authority under the juvenile code to order the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services to accept a tendered relinquishment of parental rights. In re Interest of Elizabeth S., 282 Neb. 1015, 809 N.W.2d 495 (2012).

Pursuant to this section, a child, not the parent, is adjudicated in order to protect the child's rights. The rights of a parent are determined in the dispositional phase of the case. In re Interest of Devin W. et al., 270 Neb. 640, 707 N.W.2d 758 (2005).

A court is not prohibited from considering prior events when determining whether to terminate parental rights, but the court may need to consider the reasonableness of a plan or its individual provisions. In re Interest of Ty M. & Devon M., 265 Neb. 150, 655 N.W.2d 672 (2003).

Evidence that established (1) a child sustained injuries of a nature not likely to occur in the normal course of the child's movement, (2) such injuries would have some physical manifestations associated with them, and (3) the parent failed to seek medical treatment for 2 to 4 weeks is sufficient to find the child is a neglected child within the Nebraska Juvenile Code. In re Interest of A.L.G., 230 Neb. 732, 432 N.W.2d 852 (1988).

Where parents are unable or unwilling to rehabilitate themselves within a reasonable time, the best interests of the child require that parental rights be terminated. In re Interest of N.B., 230 Neb. 717, 432 N.W.2d 850 (1988).

Where poor housekeeping degenerates into a continuing health hazard, the best interests of the children require termination of parental rights. In re Interest of E.R., J.R., and A.R., 230 Neb. 646, 432 N.W.2d 834 (1988).

Section 43-292(6) does not require the court to proceed under that subsection whenever a determination has been made under this section; the court may terminate parental rights when it appears that any one of the six conditions under section 43-292 has been met. In re Interest of J.A. and T.A., 229 Neb. 271, 426 N.W.2d 277 (1988).

Pursuant to subsection (6) of section 43-292, termination of parental rights requires a finding that following a determination that the juvenile is one as described in subsection (3)(a) of this section, reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family if required under section 43-283.01, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the determination. In re Interest of Stacey D. & Shannon D., 12 Neb. App. 707, 684 N.W.2d 594 (2004).

This section allows the juvenile court to "otherwise discharge" the juvenile from its jurisdiction without providing any limitations on the reasons for the court to order such discharge. In re Interest of Steven K., 11 Neb. App. 828, 661 N.W.2d 320 (2003).

Pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section, the trial court's failure to advise a mother of her rights, of the possible dispositions, or of the nature of juvenile court proceedings arising from the State's petition alleging that the mother inappropriately disciplined her 20-month-old child and that the child was without proper parental care through the mother's fault or habits violated the mother's due process rights, even though the mother vigorously defended against the charges. In re Interest of Billie B., 8 Neb. App. 791, 601 N.W.2d 799 (1999).

In the absence of an adjudication petition and hearing in compliance with this section, an order purporting to terminate parental rights pursuant to section 43-292 is a nullity. In re Interest of Joelyann H., 6 Neb. App. 472, 574 N.W.2d 185 (1998).

4. Rehabilitation plan

A dispositional order imposing a rehabilitation plan for parents in a juvenile case is a final, appealable order. In re Interest of Ty M. & Devon M., 265 Neb. 150, 655 N.W.2d 672 (2003).

A dispositional order in which a juvenile court declines to order a rehabilitation plan for parents of a child adjudicated under subsection (3)(a) of this section is a final, appealable order. A juvenile court is not required to order or implement a rehabilitation plan for the parent of a child adjudicated under subsection (3)(a) of this section if the plan has very little chance of success and is not in the best interests of the child. Where a child's substantial medical needs resulting from injury caused by parental abuse necessitated 24-hour daily nursing care for the child, the juvenile court did not err in accepting recommendation of the Department of Health and Human Services that no rehabilitation plan be implemented to reunite a child with his or her parents. In re Interest of Tabatha R., 255 Neb. 818, 587 N.W.2d 109 (1998).

The purpose of section 43-292(6) is to advance the best interests of the child by giving the juvenile court power to terminate parental rights where the grounds for adjudicating the child within subsection (3)(a) of this section have not been corrected. Whether a parent is willful or not in his or her noncompliance with a rehabilitation plan is not directly relevant to this purpose. While it is true that one purpose of a rehabilitation plan is to ameliorate the particular conditions that serve as the basis for an allegation supporting the adjudication that a child is within the meaning of subsection (3)(a) of this section, a rehabilitation plan also has the larger goal of reuniting the child with the parent. To advance this goal, the juvenile court has broad discretion to prescribe a reasonable plan to rehabilitate a parent whose child has been adjudicated to be within the meaning of subsection (3)(a) of this section. In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 251 Neb. 614, 558 N.W.2d 548 (1997).

After an adjudication hearing and before entering an order with a rehabilitation plan for a parent, the court shall inform the parent that a rehabilitation plan may be ordered and shall hold a hearing to determine reasonable provisions. The court's findings of fact supporting the provisions of the rehabilitation plan shall be stated in the record. Petition must allege that the parent's poor parenting skills adversely affected the child in question. In re Interest of D.M.B., 240 Neb. 349, 481 N.W.2d 905 (1992).

After an adjudication under subdivision (3)(a) of this section and before entering an order containing a rehabilitative plan for a parent, a juvenile court shall inform the juvenile's parents that the court may order a rehabilitative plan and thereafter shall hold an evidentiary hearing to determine reasonable provisions material to the parental plan's rehabilitative objective of correcting, eliminating, or ameliorating the situation or condition on which the adjudication has been obtained. In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 417 N.W.2d 147 (1987).

5. Placement with Department of Health and Human Services

Pursuant to subdivision (8) of this section, it was not necessary for the State to file a second supplemental petition to return two wards to the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services after their guardianships were disrupted because the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over the wards pursuant to section 43-1312.01(3). In re Interest of Mekhi S. et al., 309 Neb. 529, 960 N.W.2d 732 (2021).

A juvenile court need not ensure that every conceivable probationary condition has been tried and failed before it may place a juvenile at a youth rehabilitation and treatment center. Nor does section 43-286 require that supervisory conditions of a juvenile previously classified as a neglect case under subdivision (3)(a) of this section must “start over” when the matter becomes a delinquency case and subject to the Office of Juvenile Services. In re Interest of Nedhal A., 289 Neb. 711, 856 N.W.2d 565 (2014).

The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for the costs of placing and caring for juveniles within its custody, regardless of which subsection of this section that juvenile is adjudicated under. In re Interest of Jeremy T., 257 Neb. 736, 600 N.W.2d 747 (1999).

A juvenile court has no statutory authority to place children adjudged under subsection (1) with the Department of Social Services. In re Interest of C.G. and G.G.T., 221 Neb. 409, 377 N.W.2d 529 (1985).

Disposition of juveniles adjudicated as falling within this section is pursuant to sections 43-283 to 43-2,101. Juveniles adjudged under subsection (3)(a) or (b) may be placed under the custody and care of the Department of Social Services. Juvenile courts have broad discretion as to the disposition of children found to be neglected under this section. In re Interest of V.T. and L.T., 220 Neb. 256, 369 N.W.2d 94 (1985).

The burden is upon the State to allege and prove in a detention hearing that the juvenile court should not place children with their other natural parent after the expiration of the first 48 hours of emergency detention under subsection (4) of section 43-250 during a period of temporary detention pending adjudication spawned by allegations under subsection (3)(a) of this section against their custodial parent. In re Interest of Stephanie H. et al., 10 Neb. App. 908, 639 N.W.2d 668 (2002).

In addition to lacking the authority to order the Department of Health and Human Services to supervise a juvenile's probation, the juvenile court also lacks the authority to order the Department of Health and Human Services to supervise a juvenile's house arrest or to oversee a juvenile's payment of restitution. In re Interest of Juan L., 6 Neb. App. 683, 577 N.W.2d 319 (1998).

6. Presence of child

It is within the trial court's discretion whether or not to permit a child to be present at an adjudication hearing in a proceeding pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section. In re Interest of D.D.P., 235 Neb. 864, 458 N.W.2d 193 (1990).

7. Evidence

Although the Legislature did not specify a standard of proof under subsection (3)(c) of this section, the section does reference the Mental Health Commitment Act. Mental health commitments have been made under a clear and convincing evidence standard in Nebraska for approximately the last 30 years, and the Nebraska Supreme Court finds no reason to apply a different standard of proof in a juvenile case. In re Interest of Christopher T., 281 Neb. 1008, 801 N.W.2d 243 (2011).

Subsection (3)(a) of this section is not void for vagueness because it is interpreted in light of its common understanding. At the adjudication stage, in order for a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of minor children under subsection (3)(a) of this section, the State must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Interest of T.M.B. et al., 241 Neb. 828, 491 N.W.2d 58 (1992).

Evidence was sufficient to establish minors were in a situation dangerous to life or limb or injurious to their health or morals. In re Interest of D.P.Y. and J.L.Y., 239 Neb. 647, 477 N.W.2d 573 (1991).

The fact that a juvenile comes within the purview of this section must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Interest of D.A., 239 Neb. 264, 475 N.W.2d 511 (1991).

Subsection (3)(a) of this section requires that the State prove the allegations set forth in the adjudication petition by a preponderance of the evidence in cases involving both non-Indian and Indian children. In re Interest of Mischa S., 22 Neb. App. 105, 847 N.W.2d 749 (2014).

Although the State need not prove that the juvenile has suffered physical harm to find the juvenile to be within the meaning of subsection (3)(a) of this section, the State must establish that without intervention, there is a definite risk of future harm. In re Interest of Chloe P., 21 Neb. App. 456, 840 N.W.2d 549 (2013).

Subsection (3)(a) of this section requires that the State prove the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence in cases involving both non-Indian and Indian children. In re Interest of Emma J., 18 Neb. App. 389, 782 N.W.2d 330 (2010).

Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove that a child is a juvenile within the meaning of subsection (3)(a) of this section where the record shows (1) a parent's control over the child during the period when the abuse or neglect occurred and (2) multiple injuries or other serious impairment of health have occurred which ordinarily would not occur in the absence of abuse or neglect. In re Interest of McCauley H., 3 Neb. App. 474, 529 N.W.2d 77 (1995).

8. Abused or neglected child

In the context of denying parental preference in a placement decision during proceedings under subdivision (3)(a) of this section, reasonable notice must include the factual bases for seeking to prove that the parent is unfit or has forfeited parental rights or that exceptional circumstances exist involving serious physical or psychological harm to the child or a substantial likelihood of such harm. In re Interest of A.A. et al., 307 Neb. 817, 951 N.W.2d 144 (2020).

When the allegations of a petition for adjudication invoking the jurisdiction of the juvenile court are against one parent only, the State cannot deny the request of the other parent—who has acquired constitutionally protected parental status—for temporary physical custody in lieu of a foster care placement, unless it pleads and proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the other parent is unfit or has forfeited custody or that there are exceptional circumstances involving serious physical or psychological harm to the child or a substantial likelihood of such harm. In re Interest of A.A. et al., 307 Neb. 817, 951 N.W.2d 144 (2020).

"Parental" as used in the phrase "lacks proper parental care" describes the type and nature of care rather than the relationship of the person providing it. In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., 304 Neb. 734, 936 N.W.2d 733 (2020).

"Proper parental care" includes providing a home, support, subsistence, education, and other care necessary for the health, morals, and well-being of the child. It commands special care for the children in special need because of mental condition. It commands that the child not be placed in situations dangerous to life or limb, and not be permitted to engage in activities injurious to his or her health or morals. In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., 304 Neb. 734, 936 N.W.2d 733 (2020).

The juvenile court properly declined to adjudicate two children who received proper parental care from their grandmother and were not at risk of harm from their mother; however, the court erred in failing to adjudicate a newborn, who lacked proper parental care as demonstrated by his mother's drug use during pregnancy until the time of his birth. In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., 304 Neb. 734, 936 N.W.2d 733 (2020).

While the State need not prove that a child has actually suffered physical harm to assert jurisdiction, Nebraska case law is clear that at a minimum, the State must establish that without intervention, there is a definite risk of future harm. In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., 304 Neb. 734, 936 N.W.2d 733 (2020).

Once a plan of reunification has been ordered to correct the conditions underlying the adjudication under subsection (3)(a) of this section, the plan must be reasonably related to the objective of reuniting the parent with the child. In re Interest of Mainor T. & Estela T., 267 Neb. 232, 674 N.W.2d 442 (2004).

Given the broad power granted by the Legislature to juvenile courts to determine whether in proceedings under subsection (3)(a) of this section the guardian ad litem role and the role of counsel for the juvenile should be split, an appellate court reviews the decision to use or not use that power de novo on the record for an abuse of discretion. In re Interest of J.K., 265 Neb. 253, 656 N.W.2d 253 (2003).

The determination whether "special reasons" exist for appointing separate counsel for a juvenile in proceedings under subsection (3)(a) of this section must be based on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances. In re Interest of J.K., 265 Neb. 253, 656 N.W.2d 253 (2003).

When an attorney is appointed for a juvenile under subsections (2) and (3) of section 43-272 in proceedings under subsection (3)(a) of this section, the attorney generally serves as both guardian ad litem and as counsel for the child. In re Interest of J.K., 265 Neb. 253, 656 N.W.2d 253 (2003).

Section 43-258 does not apply to requests for mental and physical examinations after a juvenile has been adjudicated under subsection (3)(a) of this section. In re Interest of Ty M. & Devon M., 265 Neb. 150, 655 N.W.2d 672 (2003).

A guardian's admission of allegations of abuse in a juvenile petition is a sufficient basis for an adjudication under this section when evidence shows that a parent has previously lost custody of his or her natural child and plays no role in the child's living conditions at the time the child is taken into custody. In re Interest of Sabrina K., 262 Neb. 871, 635 N.W.2d 727 (2001).

A petition brought under subsection (3)(a) of this section is brought on behalf of the child, not to punish the parents. In re Interest of Danielle D. et al., 257 Neb. 198, 595 N.W.2d 544 (1999).

Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, while the State's parens patriae interest in the welfare of a child authorizes it to initiate abuse and neglect proceedings pursuant to this section and request temporary custody pending adjudication, the denial of such a request does not affect any substantial right of the State. In re Interest of Anthony G., 255 Neb. 442, 586 N.W.2d 427 (1998).

Under subsection (3)(a) of this section, a petition filed under this section is brought on behalf of the child, not to punish the parents. In re Interest of Amber G. et al., 250 Neb. 973, 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996).

The dual purpose of proceedings brought under subsection (3)(a) of this section on the ground that a juvenile is homeless, destitute, or without proper support through no fault of the parents, guardian, or custodian is to protect the welfare of the minor and to safeguard the parents' right to properly raise their own child, and a petition thereunder is brought on behalf of the child, not to punish the parents. In re Interest of Constance G., 247 Neb. 629, 529 N.W.2d 534 (1995).

Subsection (3)(a) of this section is not void for vagueness because it is interpreted in light of its common understanding. At the adjudication stage, in order for a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of minor children under subsection (3)(a) of this section, the State must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Interest of T.M.B. et al., 241 Neb. 828, 491 N.W.2d 58 (1992).

The juvenile court has broad discretion as to the disposition of children neglected as defined in subdivision (3)(a) of this section. In re Interest of K.L.C. and K.C., 227 Neb. 76, 416 N.W.2d 18 (1987).

Evidence that a child's mother took an unprescribed morphine pill was insufficient to adjudicate the child when there was no evidence that the child was affected by the mother's ingestion of the pill or any other evidence that the mother's taking the pill placed the child at risk for harm. In re Interest of Taeven Z., 19 Neb. App. 831, 812 N.W.2d 313 (2012).

Evidence that a nearly 2-year-old child was left unsupervised outside for a few minutes was insufficient to establish a definite risk of future harm. In re Interest of Taeven Z., 19 Neb. App. 831, 812 N.W.2d 313 (2012).

9. Miscellaneous

There is no presumption that a disabled parent is unfit, that a disabled parent has forfeited parental rights, or that exceptional circumstances exist involving serious physical or psychological harm to the child or a substantial likelihood of such harm because a parent is disabled. In re Interest of A.A. et al., 307 Neb. 817, 951 N.W.2d 144 (2020).

The factual allegations of a petition seeking to adjudicate a child must give a parent notice of the bases for seeking to prove that the child is within the meaning of the statute. In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., 304 Neb. 734, 936 N.W.2d 733 (2020).

A parent's absenteeism cannot defeat the juvenile court's authority to promote and protect a juvenile's best interests under subdivision (3)(b) of this section. In re Interest of Reality W., 302 Neb. 878, 925 N.W.2d 355 (2019).

A juvenile court may not, under section 43-285(2), change a juvenile's permanency plan from family reunification to guardianship unless there has been a prior adjudication of the juvenile under subdivision (3)(a) of this section, which adjudication is a requirement under section 43-1312.01 for establishing a juvenile guardianship. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).

In a juvenile adjudication under subdivision (3)(c) of this section, no determination is made of a parent's ability to care for his or her child. Nor does the parent have the opportunity to respond to the allegations in the petition, because the allegations relate only to the juvenile and not to the parent. The absence of an opportunity for parents to respond to allegations about their fitness to raise their children implicates their due process rights. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).

In a juvenile case adjudicated under subdivision (3)(a) of this section, a parent has both the opportunity and the incentive to contest and appeal the adjudication, which the parent does not have when the child is adjudicated under subdivision (3)(c) of this section. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).

In a juvenile case adjudicated under subdivision (3)(a) of this section, a parent has the opportunity to deny a petition's allegations, whereas in an adjudication under subdivision (3)(c), the juvenile responds but parents have no statutory right to respond. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).

Subdivision (3)(c) of this section is substantially different from subsection (3)(a), which, generally speaking, applies to situations in which a juvenile lacks proper parental care, support, or supervision. Because a subdivision (3)(a) adjudication addresses the issue of parental fitness, significant legal consequences can flow from such an adjudication and greater procedural protections are required. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).

Pursuant to subdivision (1) of this section, a juvenile court does not have the statutory authority to order detention while a juvenile remains on probation. In re Interest of Dakota M., 279 Neb. 802, 781 N.W.2d 612 (2010).

The county attorney's coordinated effort with the school and its letter referring the family to various available community-based resources, including website resources, as well as specific contact information for a "Truancy Resource Specialist," complied with the "reasonable efforts" requirement of subsection (2) of section 43-276 as applied to the habitual truancy provision of subdivision (3)(b) of this section. In re Interest of Hla H., 25 Neb. App. 118, 903 N.W.2d 664 (2017).

Compulsory education statutes and juvenile code statutes regarding the neglect of children generally do not pertain to the same subject matter and should not be construed in pari materia. In re Interest of Laticia S., 21 Neb. App. 921, 844 N.W.2d 841 (2014).

Subsection (3)(a) of this section establishes the juvenile court's jurisdiction over a minor child, while sections 79-201 and 79-210 make the minor child's parents or legal guardians culpable for the child's truancy. The county attorney is free to decide whether to proceed utilizing the juvenile code or the compulsory education laws. In re Interest of Laticia S., 21 Neb. App. 921, 844 N.W.2d 841 (2014).

The school's duty to provide services in an attempt to address excessive absenteeism comes from section 79-209, relating to compulsory attendance and the possibility of a parent's being subjected to a criminal sanction. The school has no duty to provide reasonable efforts before an adjudication under subsection (3)(a) of this section of the juvenile code. In re Interest of Laticia S., 21 Neb. App. 921, 844 N.W.2d 841 (2014).

Section 43-274(1) authorizes a county attorney with knowledge of a juvenile in his or her county falling within the purview of subsection (3)(a) of this section to file a petition in that county's juvenile court. In re Interest of Tegan V., 18 Neb. App. 857, 794 N.W.2d 190 (2011).

Pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section, a mother was not properly placed on notice that her mental health would be the basis for seeking to prove an allegation that her child lacked proper parental care and was at risk of harm through the mother's fault when the allegations in a termination of parental rights petition concerned only the condition of her house and the lack of appropriate food for her child and did not mention the mother's mental health. In re Interest of Christian L., 18 Neb. App. 276, 780 N.W.2d 39 (2010).

In the exercise of its jurisdiction over a custody modification proceeding, a county court sitting as a juvenile court cannot permanently modify child custody through the mere adoption of a case plan pursuant to section 43-285(2). In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63, 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009).

A juvenile case brought under subsection (3)(a) of this section fits the definition of a "child custody proceeding" under section 43-1227(4) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. In re Interest of Maxwell T., 15 Neb. App. 47, 721 N.W.2d 676 (2006).

The dual purpose of proceedings brought under subsection (3)(a) of this section, to protect the welfare of the child and to safeguard the parent's right to properly raise his or her own child, is applicable even though the allegation is that the child lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his or her parent. In re Interest of Stephanie H. et al., 10 Neb. App. 908, 639 N.W.2d 668 (2002).