1. Burden-shifting framework
1. Burden-shifting framework
The three-part burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), is not the exclusive method of proving disparate treatment and was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Hartley v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 294 Neb. 870, 885 N.W.2d 675 (2016).
In a discrimination suit brought under the provisions of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, the evidence presented on the issue of discrimination against a disabled person shall be as follows: (1) The complainant has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) if the complainant succeeds in proving that prima facie case, the burden shifts to the respondent to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection or discharge from employment; and (3) should the respondent carry the burden, the complainant must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the respondent were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. IBP, Inc. v. Sands, 252 Neb. 573, 563 N.W.2d 353 (1997).
A plaintiff alleging he or she was subjected to retaliatory action based upon opposing or refusing to participate in a practice or action which was unlawful only has to show a reasonable, good faith belief such practice or action was unlawful. Haffke v. Signal 88, 306 Neb. 625, 947 N.W.2d 103 (2020).
In order to show retaliation under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, a plaintiff must establish (1) he or she engaged in protected conduct, (2) he or she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Haffke v. Signal 88, 306 Neb. 625, 947 N.W.2d 103 (2020).
A prima facie case of discrimination may be proved by showing (1) that the complainant is a member of a protected class within the meaning of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act; (2) that the complainant is qualified for the position of employment sought; (3) that the complainant applied for and was rejected or discharged from that position; and (4) that after the complainant was rejected or discharged, the job remained open. IBP, Inc. v. Sands, 252 Neb. 573, 563 N.W.2d 353 (1997).
Persons seeking relief under this section must allege a violation by an employer of 15 or more persons. Steier v. Crosier Fathers of Hastings, 242 Neb. 16, 492 N.W.2d 870 (1992).
A female is a member of a protected class. Lincoln County Sheriff's Office v. Horne, 228 Neb. 473, 423 N.W.2d 412 (1988).
"Disability" designates a protected class regarding employment in Nebraska. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Goerke, 224 Neb. 731, 401 N.W.2d 461 (1987).
The purpose of the Fair Employment Practice Act is to establish a policy by the state to foster the employment of employable persons; the state policy does not require an employer to grant preferential treatment to any individual or group because of race, color, religion, sex, disability, or national origin. Nebraska P.P. Dist. v. Lacy, 215 Neb. 462, 339 N.W.2d 286 (1983).
These sections do not mandate the employment of firemen with visual defects which would affect their ability to engage in that occupation. McCrea v. Cunningham, 202 Neb. 638, 277 N.W.2d 52 (1979).
One hundred eighty day statute of limitations under Fair Employment Practices Act may not be applied in federal civil rights action. Chambers v. Omaha Public School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976).
Petition for civil rights relief alleging employment discrimination dismissed where requisite prior exhaustion of administrative remedies disregarded. Thorson v. City of Omaha, 445 F.Supp. 268 (D. Neb. 1978).
Under facts in this case, corporation did not violate Civil Rights Act by transferring employee to lower paying job when he refused to work on his Sabbath day. Dixon v. Omaha P.P. Dist., 385 F.Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974).