1. Good cause
2. Certificate
3. Miscellaneous
1. Good cause
Good cause means a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse, and it is a factual question dealt with on a case-by-case basis. State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016).
Under some circumstances, courtroom unavailability may constitute good cause to continue a trial. State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016).
When defense counsel requested to schedule trial for a date after the conclusion of another trial in which defense counsel was involved, such request amounted to a request for continuance, and the district court's accession to it established good cause to extend the period within which the defendant could be brought to trial. State v. Rouse, 13 Neb. App. 90, 688 N.W.2d 889 (2004).
Good cause existed to continue a trial that charged a prisoner, who was incarcerated on an unrelated offense, with making terroristic threats against a juvenile court judge, beyond the 180-day time limit in this section setting forth requirements for when the untried charges were to be brought to trial. The day after the pretrial conference setting the trial date, the juvenile court judge informed the State he would be unavailable for trial on that date, and the State came forward as soon as possible after the trial was scheduled to inform the court and opposing counsel about the conflict. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).
"Good cause" in intrastate or interstate detainer statutes means a substantial reason; one that affords legal excuse. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).
Good cause in statutory provisions setting forth requirements for disposition of untried cases is something that must be substantial, but also a factual question dealt with on a case-by-case basis. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).
Good cause under statutory provisions setting forth requirements for disposition of untried cases encompasses a situation where a witness is unavailable. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).
Whether good cause exists for extending the time limit in this section, setting forth when untried charges are brought to trial, is a subjective, factual question within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Caldwell, 10 Neb. App. 803, 639 N.W.2d 663 (2002).
2. Certificate
Form VII could not serve to trigger the 180-day period under this section, since it was only filed in the county court and not delivered to the director of the Department of Correctional Services. State v. LeFever, 30 Neb. App. 562, 970 N.W.2d 792 (2022).
The certificate contemplated by this section is not restricted to one particular form. State v. LeFever, 30 Neb. App. 562, 970 N.W.2d 792 (2022).
Whether invoked by an instate prisoner or by the prosecutor, it is the prosecutor's receipt of the statutorily required certificate from the director of the Department of Correctional Services pursuant to section 29-3803 or section 29-3804 which triggers the 180-day period for disposition of untried charges prescribed by this section. State v. LeFever, 30 Neb. App. 562, 970 N.W.2d 792 (2022).
3. Miscellaneous
A Nebraska prisoner sought relief under two different speedy trial statutes, but only this section, governing intrastate detainers, applied. State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016).
The statutory right of a person in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services to a speedy trial on pending criminal charges in Nebraska is governed by sections 29-3801 to 29-3809. The denial of a speedy trial claim governed by these sections is a final, appealable order. State v. Tucker, 259 Neb. 225, 609 N.W.2d 306 (2000).
Defense counsel's implicit request for a continuance did not operate as a waiver of the defendant's right to a disposition within the time limit imposed by the instate prisoner statutes; it merely extended the duration of the time period allowed for commencement of trial. State v. Rouse, 13 Neb. App. 90, 688 N.W.2d 889 (2004).
The law and decisions under the speedy trial statutes did not apply to the instate prisoner statutes, particularly this section; therefore, defendant's various pretrial motions did not toll the time period allowed for the commencement of trial. State v. Rouse, 13 Neb. App. 90, 688 N.W.2d 889 (2004).