

put a dollar value on pain and suffering, on emotional distress, on future lost wages and the like, and that that amount of money is reduced to present value which means that although you may find that there might be \$300,000 of lost future wages, that gets discounted to present value. However, I guess the place that I have a lot of sympathy is when a plaintiff gets injured, has some medical bills, has some lost wages between the time that the injury is suffered and the time of the judgment, suffer some personal property damage, and doesn't receive compensation until sometime later. If that later judgment and that later compensation is dollar for dollar for the injury, the plaintiff has lost the time value of that money for whatever period of time has transpired. It seems to me that if I take a dollar out of my pocket, spend it today, and am given, after a year's time, a dollar in return for the dollar out of my pocket, I haven't gotten the dollar's worth of value in return. I have gotten 95 cents of value in return or 92 cents of value in return for my cost and I have a lot of sympathy for a plaintiff recovering in that instance. I guess I don't have quite as much sympathy or have the same sense of wrong or making whole for some projected emotional distress or some sense of pain and suffering that is attached to that loss. I understand that if my bicycle gets broken or my fender gets bumped in or I have got a thousand dollars of medical expenses for a cast on my leg and a two day stay in the hospital, that I understand. And to me prejudgment interest makes good sense in that situation. As a matter of fact, I would go back to an earlier time to apply the running of the prejudgment interest myself, and I would raise the interest rate to what the postjudgment interest rate is and make sure that there is no distinction between those two. However, that is not my will today. I just bring you two parts of the amendment. First, a limitation of the kind of damages on which prejudgment interest will be given to hard dollars a plaintiff spends and doesn't get compensation for prior to the judgment. And, secondly, if a case is run longer than the Supreme Court says is customary, is fair, reasonable, and if one side can persuade a judge that the other side was strategically delaying without a good purpose, that there be some kind of injury against the delaying party. I offer the amendment in good faith. I think it is an amendment which can make the bill livable to 25 people, that is if the proponents regard there being any benefit to a bill cast in this fashion. If not, the measure dies and we go back to LB 157 as it is presently constituted. I move the adoption