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I am confident out of my experience in it that it is the best system that exists on the face of this planet. And whether or not it continues to meet that standard of performance will depend upon people, average people like you and me, who have the opportunity to serve. Well, I could go on. I have developed a habit of that over twenty-two years. I don't think I should. It was suggested that I might address myself to one specific question which was raised at this morning's Town and Gown breakfast at which a lot of questions were raised which I enjoyed discussing with people of the community and people of the campus and that is the question of the grain embargo. I will simply give you the facts as I have perceived them as Secretary of State, and you, of course, will draw your own conclusions. First of all, the grain embargo as a response to the Soviet Afghanistan invasion was a carefully targeted policy. It was targeted in light of the understanding that the Soviets faced a short crop that year, one hundred and seventy to a hundred and eighty million metric tons, forty to fifty million metric tons short of their requirements and so it was on its face a possibly severe cost to impose. It did not succeed in making up what we denied them, and as a result it was necessary to dip into their grain reserves, it was necessary to reduce the size of their cattle herds, it was necessary for them to reduce their targets for per capita meat diet, which at that time and now are below those of the Polish people, and you are aware of the ferment that the problem of food has created in Poland. And so it did impose a cost and a severe one. It was not enough, true, to persuade the Russians to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan but it is a continuing cost of which they are well aware and the good Lord joined us in giving them a second short crop year in a row, a similar shortage. The question is, does the cost which we impose on them, does it offset whatever cost it imposes on us? And we must recognize that if we wish to impose any cost on the Russians by any manner, that the other side of that is that it would impose a cost on us. There is no way of doing something to the Russians which they will feel that we won't feel also. Whether you speak about grain embargoes or military response or an Olympic boycott or technological denial to them, advanced technology or conventional technology or what have you, all of these actions which are available to us, if we use them, impose a cost on them. We must strike a balance in each case. There is one other factor now that enters into the question of grain embargo and that is that the signal the lifting of the embargo would send to the Russians, at a time when they appear to be building up their forces in Afghanistan above the level attained last year, at a time