A civil action must be commenced by filing a complaint in the office of the clerk of a proper court.

Cross References

When action is deemed commenced, see section 25-217.
Workers' compensation cases, petition, filing, contents, see section 48-173.

Annotations

When disbarred attorney commenced action, dismissal was proper. Niklaus v. Abel Construction Co., 164 Neb. 842, 83 N.W.2d 904 (1957).
A writ of replevin which is quashed or dismissed does not give the court jurisdiction to continue with the action. Tiedtke v. Whalen, 133 Neb. 301, 275 N.W. 79 (1937).
It is not essential that action be denominated either in law or in equity; if facts pleaded constitute cause of action or defense, courts will award relief. Rhoads v. Columbia Fire Underwriters Agency, 128 Neb. 710, 260 N.W. 174 (1935).
Cited in case involving amendment of summons on appeal from compensation award. Keil v. Farmers Irr. Dist., 119 Neb. 503, 229 N.W. 898 (1930).
Action is deemed commenced as to defendant, at date of summons which is served upon him. Ramirez v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 116 Neb. 740, 219 N.W. 1 (1928).
One not served with process in an action, who does not appear in person, or by attorney, is not bound by judgment rendered therein. Lipps v. Panko, 93 Neb. 469, 140 N.W. 761 (1913).
New summons is unnecessary on amendment of petition if same causes of action are preserved. Schuyler Nat. Bank v. Bollong, 28 Neb. 684, 45 N.W. 164 (1890).

The plaintiff shall file with the clerk of the court a praecipe for summons stating the name and address of each party to be served and the manner of service for each party. Upon written request of the plaintiff, separate or additional summonses shall be issued.

(1) The summons shall be directed to the defendant or defendants, and contain the names of the parties and the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, otherwise the address of the plaintiff. It shall notify defendant that in order to defend the lawsuit an appropriate written response shall be filed with the court within thirty days after service, and that upon failure to do so the court may enter judgment for the relief demanded in the complaint.

(2) A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from that demanded in the complaint. If only special damages are demanded a judgment by default shall not exceed the amount demanded in the complaint.

Cross References

Workers' compensation cases, court issues summons, see sections 48-174 and 48-190.

A copy of the complaint shall be served with the summons, except when service is by publication. The plaintiff shall deliver to the clerk sufficient copies of the complaint at the time it is filed.

(1) Unless otherwise limited by statute or by the court, a plaintiff may elect to have service made by any of the following methods:

(a) Personal service which shall be made by leaving the summons with the individual to be served;

(b) Residence service which shall be made by leaving the summons at the usual place of residence of the individual to be served, with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein;

(c) Certified mail service which shall be made by (i) within ten days of issuance, sending the summons to the defendant by certified mail with a return receipt requested showing to whom and where delivered and the date of delivery, and (ii) filing with the court proof of service with the signed receipt attached; or

(d) Designated delivery service which shall be made by (i) within ten days of issuance, sending the summons by a designated delivery service to the defendant, (ii) obtaining a signed delivery receipt showing to whom and where delivered and the date of delivery, and (iii) filing with the court proof of service with a copy of the signed delivery receipt attached. As used in this subdivision, a designated delivery service means a delivery service designated as such pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7502(f) and a signed delivery receipt includes an electronic or facsimile receipt with an image of the recipient's signature.

(2) Failure to make service by the method elected by the plaintiff does not affect the validity of the service.

(3) The State Court Administrator shall maintain on the website of the Supreme Court a list of designated delivery services.

Cross References

Workers' compensation cases, manner and time of service, see sections 48-174, 48-175, 48-175.01, and 48-190.

Annotations

This section does not require service to be sent to the defendant's residence or restrict delivery to the addressee. But service must still comply with the due process requirement that notice be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them the opportunity to present their objections. Doe v. Board of Regents, 280 Neb. 492, 788 N.W.2d 264 (2010).
Plaintiff may elect to have service made by any of the methods specified in the statute. West Town Homeowners Assn. v. Schneider, 221 Neb. 674, 380 N.W.2d 265 (1986).
Although this section does not require service to be sent to the defendant's residence or restrict delivery to the addressee, due process requires notice to be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them the opportunity to present their objections. Capital One Bank v. Lehmann, 23 Neb. App. 292, 869 N.W.2d 917 (2015).
Personal service at work rather than at home, despite the designation on the praecipe of where service should be effected, is nonetheless valid service. Hatcher v. McShane, 12 Neb. App. 239, 670 N.W.2d 638 (2003).

(1) Unless the plaintiff has elected certified mail service or designated delivery service, the summons shall be served by the sheriff of the county where service is made, by a person authorized by section 25-507 or otherwise authorized by law, or by a person, corporation, partnership, or limited liability company not a party to the action specially appointed by the court for that purpose.

(2) Certified mail service or designated delivery service shall be made by the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney.

Cross References

Workers' compensation cases, manner and time of service, see sections 48-174, 48-175, 48-175.01, and 48-190.

(1) In any county which does not have a person contracted as a constable pursuant to section 25-2229, any person twenty-one years of age or older or a corporation, partnership, or limited liability company that satisfies the requirements of subsection (2) of this section shall have the same power as a sheriff to execute any service of process or order.

(2) Any person or entity may exercise the powers provided in subsection (1) of this section if such person or entity (a) is not a party to the action, (b) is not related to a party to the action, (c) does not have an interest in the action, (d) is not a public official employed by the county where service is made whose duties include service of process, and (e) furnishes a good and sufficient corporate surety bond in the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, such bond being conditioned upon such person or entity faithfully and truly performing the duties of process server.

(3) Evidence of the corporate surety bond shall be provided to the clerk of each court in which such person or entity executes service of process or orders. Such person or entity is not required to furnish more than one bond to execute service of process or orders in any state court in the State of Nebraska. When service of process is made by such person or entity authorized by this section, proof of such service of process shall be shown by an affidavit.

(4) The cost of service of process is taxable as a court cost, and when service of process is made by such person or entity other than a sheriff the cost taxable as a court cost is the lesser of the actual amount incurred for service of process or orders or the statutory fee set for sheriffs in section 33-117.

(1) Within twenty days after the date of issue, the person serving the summons, other than by certified mail service or designated delivery service, shall make proof of service to the court stating the time, place, including the address if applicable, name of the person with whom the summons was left, and method of service, or return the unserved summons to the court with a statement of the reason for the failure to serve.

(2) When service is by certified mail service or designated delivery service, the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney shall file proof of service within ten days after the signed receipt is received or is available electronically, whichever occurs first.

(3) Failure to make proof of service or delay in doing so does not affect the validity of the service.

Cross References

Workers' compensation cases, manner and time of service, see sections 48-174, 48-175, 48-175.01, and 48-190.

(1) An individual party, other than a person under the age of fourteen years, may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service.

(2) A party under the age of fourteen years may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service upon an adult person with whom the minor resides and who is the minor's parent or guardian or the person having care of the minor. If none of these can be found, a party under the age of fourteen years may be served by personal service.

(3) If the person to be served is an incapacitated person for whom a conservator or guardian has been appointed or is confined in any institution, notice of the service shall be given to the conservator or guardian or the superintendent or similar official of the institution. Failure to give such notice does not affect the validity of the service on the incapacitated person.

Annotations

Department of Health and Human Services employees were not properly served in their individual capacities where the summonses were sent via certified mail to their place of employment, the certified mail receipts were signed for by an employee who was not authorized to sign on behalf of the employees, and the summonses were not received by the employees. Anthony K. v. State, 289 Neb. 523, 855 N.W.2d 802 (2014).
Although subsection (3) of this section requires that where summons is served on an incapacitated person, notice of such service shall be given to the guardian, it also provides that failure to give such notice will not affect the validity of the service. In re Interest of A.M.K., 227 Neb. 888, 420 N.W.2d 718 (1988).

A corporation may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service upon any officer, director, managing agent, or registered agent, or by leaving the process at the corporation's registered office with a person employed therein, or by certified mail or designated delivery service to the corporation's registered office.

Cross References

For process and service on foreign insurance corporation, see sections 44-135, 44-2009 to 44-2013, and 44-5507.
Registered office of corporation, see sections 21-1934, 21-19,152, and 21-2031.

(1) The State of Nebraska, any state agency as defined in section 81-8,210, and any employee of the state as defined in section 81-8,210 sued in an official capacity may be served by leaving the summons at the office of the Attorney General with the Attorney General, deputy attorney general, or someone designated in writing by the Attorney General, or by certified mail or designated delivery service addressed to the office of the Attorney General.

(2) Any county, city, or village of this state may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service upon the chief executive officer or clerk.

(3) Any political subdivision of this state, as defined in subdivision (1) of section 13-903, other than a county, city, or village, may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service upon the chief executive officer, clerk, secretary, or other official whose duty it is to maintain the official records, or any member of the governing board or body, or by certified mail or designated delivery service to the principal office of the political subdivision.

Annotations

In analyzing the service of an agency, as when analyzing the option to serve an individual through certified mail under section 25-508.01, appellate courts look to section 25-505.01(1)(c) for the requirements of service by certified mail. Omaha Expo. & Racing v. Nebraska State Racing Comm., 307 Neb. 172, 949 N.W.2d 183 (2020).
When this section applies, a summons must be served on the Attorney General in order to institute judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, sections 84-901 through 84-920. Concordia Teachers College v. Neb. Dept. of Labor, 252 Neb. 504, 563 N.W.2d 345 (1997).
This section provides the acceptable methods of service of summons upon the Attorney General, but although some discretion is granted as to the mode of service, no discretion is granted as to the entity to be served. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys. v. Dept. of Health, 249 Neb. 405, 543 N.W.2d 466 (1996).
When this section applies, in order to institute judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, service must be had on the Attorney General. Becker v. Nebraska Acct. & Disclosure Comm., 249 Neb. 28, 541 N.W.2d 36 (1995).
In cases in which this section applies, a summons must be served on the Attorney General in order to institute judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. Glass v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 248 Neb. 501, 536 N.W.2d 344 (1995).
Pursuant to subsection (1), when a party commences an action against the State, that party's service must be served in one of the four following ways to be effective: (1) By leaving summons at the Attorney General's office with the Attorney General, (2) by leaving summons at the Attorney General's office with a deputy attorney general, (3) by leaving summons at the Attorney General's office with someone designated in writing by the Attorney General to receive summons, or (4) by sending summons by certified mail addressed to the Attorney General's office. Twiss v. Trautwein, 247 Neb. 535, 529 N.W.2d 24 (1995).
A county board of equalization is not a political subdivision "other than" a county, and service upon a county board of equalization must be accomplished pursuant to the requirements of subsection (2) rather than subsection (3) of this section. Hilt v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 30 Neb. App. 425, 970 N.W.2d 113 (2021).
This section provides that the plain meaning of the phrase "may be served," when viewed in the context of the service statutes, modifies the method of acceptable service, not the entity to be served. Hilt v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 30 Neb. App. 425, 970 N.W.2d 113 (2021).
Pursuant to this section, the Attorney General must be served on behalf of the committee and that service may be accomplished by one of the methods for which provision is made in subsection (1). Ray v. Nebraska Crime Victim's Reparations Comm., 1 Neb. App. 130, 487 N.W.2d 590 (1992).

Any employee of the state, as defined in section 81-8,210, sued in an individual capacity for an act or omission occurring in connection with duties performed on the state's behalf, regardless of whether the employee is also sued in an official capacity, must be served by serving the employee under section 25-508.01 and also by serving the state under section 25-510.02.

A dissolved corporation may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service upon any appointed receiver. If there is no receiver, a dissolved corporation may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service upon any person who at the time of dissolution was an officer, director, managing agent, or registered agent, or upon any officer or director designated in the last annual report filed with the Secretary of State.

A partnership or limited partnership may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service upon any partner except a limited partner, or by certified mail or designated delivery service at its usual place of business, or the process may be left at its usual place of business with an employee of the partnership or limited partnership.

Cross References

Registration and agent for service of process of foreign limited partnerships, see section 67-281.

An unincorporated association may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service upon an officer or managing agent, or by certified mail or designated delivery service to the association at its usual place of business, or by leaving the process at its usual place of business with an employee of the unincorporated association.

Any party may be served by personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service upon an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.

(2) A defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process may be asserted only under the procedure provided in the pleading rules adopted by the Supreme Court. If any of those defenses are asserted either by motion or in a responsive pleading and the court overrules the defense, an objection that the court erred in its ruling will be waived and not preserved for appellate review if the party asserting the defense either (a) thereafter files a demand for affirmative relief by way of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim or (b) fails to dismiss a demand for such affirmative relief that was previously filed. If any of those defenses are asserted either by motion or in a responsive pleading and the court overrules the defense, an objection that the court erred in its ruling on any issue, except an objection to the court's ruling on personal jurisdiction, will be waived and not preserved for appellate review if the party asserting the defense thereafter participates in proceedings on any issue other than those defenses.

(3) The filing of a suggestion of bankruptcy is not an appearance and does not waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process.

Annotations

"Appearance of Counsel" filed by the defendant's attorneys was not a voluntary appearance which waived service of the complaint because it did not request general relief from the court on an issue other than sufficiency of service or process or personal jurisdiction. Stone Land & Livestock Co. v. HBE, 309 Neb. 970, 962 N.W.2d 903 (2021).
The voluntary appearance of a party is equivalent to service of process for purposes of personal jurisdiction; parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court by waiving statutory requirements for a court to obtain jurisdiction through a voluntary appearance. J.S. v. Grand Island Public Schools, 297 Neb. 347, 899 N.W.2d 893 (2017).
Judicially noticed filings and the bill of exceptions in a prior modification proceeding between the parties showed that the defendant made a general appearance in the subsequent modification proceeding by asking the trial court to vacate an order, to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel, and to strike the complaint. Burns v. Burns, 293 Neb. 633, 879 N.W.2d 375 (2016).
A voluntary appearance is the equivalent to service that waives a defense of insufficient service or process if the party requests general relief from the court on an issue other than sufficiency of service or process, or personal jurisdiction. Carlson v. Allianz Versicherungs-AG, 287 Neb. 628, 844 N.W.2d 264 (2014).
A voluntary appearance signed the day before a complaint or petition is filed waives service of process if filed simultaneously with or after the petition. Johnson v. Johnson, 282 Neb. 42, 803 N.W.2d 420 (2011).
A voluntary appearance of a party is equivalent to service and, in effect, is another mode of service. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys. v. Dept. of Health, 249 Neb. 405, 543 N.W.2d 466 (1996).
By filing a suggestion in bankruptcy and an amended suggestion in bankruptcy, the party asked the court to bring its powers into action on a matter other than the question of jurisdiction, thus making a general appearance and waiving any defects in the service of process. Bayliss v. Clason, 26 Neb. App. 195, 918 N.W.2d 612 (2018).
Intended defendant's father, who bore same name as defendant without distinction of "Sr." or "Jr.," had no obligation to assert affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction or insufficient service either in answer or by motion, in plaintiff's action for personal injuries, as grounds for permitting plaintiff to serve intended defendant rather than dismissing complaint with prejudice; trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over father when father was served, and there was no objection to service of summons on father. Rudd v. Debora, 20 Neb. App. 850, 835 N.W.2d 765 (2013).
An action stood dismissed by operation of law upon the passing of 6 months after the filing of the petition, where the defendants were not served process and their voluntary appearances were entered more than 6 months after the date the petition was filed. Vopalka v. Abraham, 9 Neb. App. 285, 610 N.W.2d 433 (2000).

Upon motion and showing by affidavit that service cannot be made with reasonable diligence by any other method provided by statute, the court may permit service to be made (1) by leaving the process at the defendant's usual place of residence and mailing a copy by first-class mail to the defendant's last-known address, (2) by publication, or (3) by any manner reasonably calculated under the circumstances to provide the party with actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.

Cross References

Actions against unknown defendants, see section 25-321.
Actions to quiet title, see section 25-21,112 et seq.

Annotations

Substitute service cannot be effectively completed by using certified mail; this section allows only for the use of first-class mail. Thornton v. Thornton, 13 Neb. App. 912, 704 N.W.2d 243 (2005).
Substituted service based upon a false and misleading affidavit may be nullified. Where a parent was not given proper statutory notification of an adoption proceeding, the county court lacked jurisdiction to grant the adoption decree and the adoption was set aside. In re Adoption of Leslie P., 8 Neb. App. 954, 604 N.W.2d 853 (2000).

Service may be made by publication (1) when such service is elsewhere provided for by statute or (2) when ordered by the court.

The publication shall be made once in each week for three successive weeks in some newspaper printed in the county where the complaint is filed if there is any printed in such county and, if there is not, in some newspaper printed in this state of general circulation in that county. It shall contain a summary statement of the claim for relief of the complaint, mention the court wherein it is filed, and notify the person or persons thus to be served when they are required to answer.

Cross References

For publication of legal notices, see sections 25-2227, 25-2228, 33-141, and 33-142.

Annotations

1. How made

2. Contents

3. Miscellaneous

1. How made

In the case of substitute service by publication under this section, service is not "made" until the third publication, and prior to the third publication, a defendant is "not served" under section 25-217. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 268 Neb. 439, 684 N.W.2d 14 (2004).
Where service by publication has been approved, a defendant is not served within 6 months from the date the petition was filed under section 25-217 unless the third publication under this section has occurred within 6 months from the date the petition was filed. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 268 Neb. 439, 684 N.W.2d 14 (2004).
Publication seven times in semi-weekly newspaper was not sufficient in foreclosure of tax lien. Davis v. American Inv. & Trust Co., 94 Neb. 427, 143 N.W. 464 (1913).
Publications need not be on same day of week; "week" defined. Burr v. Finch, 91 Neb. 417, 136 N.W. 72 (1912).
Notice must be published in all regular issues during week. Smith v. Potter, 90 Neb. 298, 133 N.W. 437 (1911); Claypool v. Robb, 90 Neb. 193, 133 N.W. 178 (1911).
Notice takes place of summons; publication requiring defendant to answer on second Monday is irregular and may be set aside on motion. Calkins v. Miller, 55 Neb. 601, 75 N.W. 1108 (1898).
Four weekly publications are sufficient. Taylor v. Coots, 32 Neb. 30, 48 N.W. 964 (1891); Fouts v. Mann, 15 Neb. 172, 18 N.W. 64 (1883).
Notice requiring defendant to answer in forenoon is valid; but has whole day to answer. Armstrong v. Middlestadt, 22 Neb. 711, 36 N.W. 151 (1888).
Notice once each week for four successive weeks is completed upon distribution of last publication. Davis v. Huston, 15 Neb. 28, 16 N.W. 820 (1883).

2. Contents

Publication notice must contain a summary statement of the object and prayer of the petition, mention the court wherein it is filed, and notify the person or persons to be served when they are required to answer. Coffin v. Maitland, 146 Neb. 477, 20 N.W.2d 310 (1945).
Plaintiff's cause of action is not required to be set out in notice. Smith v. Potter, 92 Neb. 39, 137 N.W. 854 (1912).
Notice stating that action was for "partition" of lands was sufficient without reciting "partition or sale." McCormick v. Paddock, 20 Neb. 486, 30 N.W. 602 (1886).
Notice in attachment containing general description of property attached is not void. Grebe v. Jones, 15 Neb. 312, 18 N.W. 81 (1883).

3. Miscellaneous

Notice to nonresident herein complied with this section. Armstrong v. Bates, 94 Neb. 462, 143 N.W. 477 (1913).

Service by publication shall be deemed complete when it shall have been made in the manner and for the time prescribed in section 25-519; and such service shall be proved by the affidavit of the printer or his foreman or principal clerk, or other person knowing the same.

Annotations

In tax foreclosure case, section is strictly construed. Armstrong v. Griffith, 94 Neb. 515, 143 N.W. 461 (1913).
Service is complete upon distribution of paper containing its fourth successive weekly insertion. Claypool v. Robb, 90 Neb. 193, 133 N.W. 178 (1911).
Any one having actual knowledge of facts may make affidavit. Taylor v. Coots, 32 Neb. 30, 48 N.W. 964 (1891).
Court may permit amendment of affidavit to conform to facts. Britton v. Larson, 23 Neb. 806, 37 N.W. 681 (1888).

(1) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, in any action or proceeding of any kind or nature, as defined in section 25-520.02, where a notice by publication is given as authorized by law, a party instituting or maintaining the action or proceeding with respect to notice or such party's attorney shall within five days after the first publication of notice send by United States mail a copy of such published notice or, if applicable, the notice described in subsection (4) of this section, to each and every party appearing to have a direct legal interest in such action or proceeding whose name and post office address are known to such party or attorney.

(2) Proof by affidavit of the mailing of such notice shall be made by the party or such party's attorney and shall be filed with the officer with whom filings are required to be made in such action or proceeding within ten days after mailing of such notice. Such affidavit of mailing of notice shall further be required to state that such party and such party's attorney, after diligent investigation and inquiry, were unable to ascertain and do not know the post office address of any other party appearing to have a direct legal interest in such action or proceeding other than those to whom notice has been mailed in writing.

(3) It shall not be necessary to serve the notice prescribed by this section upon any competent person, fiduciary, partnership, or corporation, who has waived notice in writing, has entered a voluntary appearance, or has been personally served with summons or notice in such proceeding.

(4) In the case of a lien for a special assessment imposed by any city or village, in lieu of sending a copy of published notice, the city or village may instead send by United States mail, to each and every party appearing to have a direct legal interest in such action or proceeding whose name and post office address are known to the city or village or its attorney, a notice containing the amount owed, the date due, and the date the board of equalization meets in case of an appeal.

Annotations

1. Notice not required

2. Miscellaneous

1. Notice not required

First cousins of testator were not prima facie heirs-at-law, and hence were not required to be notified by mail of pending probate of will. Estate of Colman v. Redford, 179 Neb. 270, 137 N.W.2d 822 (1965).
Notice by mail is not required to be given to the holder of a claim for unliquidated damages. Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner, 175 Neb. 94, 120 N.W.2d 537 (1963).
Notice by mail was not required to be given to property owner of intention by municipality to pass resolution of necessity for constructing sewer system. Jones v. Village of Farnam, 174 Neb. 704, 119 N.W.2d 157 (1963).
Notice was not required to be sent to all owners of land within school district of proceedings to change boundaries thereof. Lindgren v. School Dist. of Bridgeport, 170 Neb. 279, 102 N.W.2d 599 (1960).
A decedent's potential liability for an automobile accident, without establishment of liability and amount of damages, does not constitute a direct legal interest in the estate such that notice by mail must be sent to the potential creditor. Mach v. Schmer, 4 Neb. App. 819, 550 N.W.2d 385 (1996).

2. Miscellaneous

A personal representative must prove that it complied with the requirement that it mail published notice to reasonably ascertainable creditors by showing that the personal representative made a reasonably diligent search, such as a reasonably prudent person would make in view of the circumstances and must extend to those places where information is likely to be obtained and to those persons who would be likely to have information regarding a decedent's creditors. In re Estate of Loder, 308 Neb. 210, 953 N.W.2d 541 (2021).
Because the appellant did not file an affidavit that complied with this section, the appellant's constructive service was improper and the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the appellee. Francisco v. Gonzalez, 301 Neb. 1045, 921 N.W.2d 350 (2019).
Section 30-2483 requires notice to be sent to the Department of Health and Human Services under certain circumstances. To comply with this requirement, notice must be sent in accordance with this section. In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).
The 3-year limitations period of section 30-2485(a)(2) applied to the Department of Health and Human Services' Medicaid estate recovery claim because the personal representative failed to send notice to the department within 5 days of the date on which notice to creditors was first published, as required by section 30-2483 and this section. In re Estate of Cushing, 283 Neb. 571, 810 N.W.2d 741 (2012).
The requirements of this section apply to a publication of notice given under section 25-1529 governing sales on execution. KLH Retirement Planning v. Okwumuo, 263 Neb. 760, 642 N.W.2d 801 (2002).
County court which obtained jurisdiction of res of estate upon filing of petition retains jurisdiction until service of notice is perfected or until matter is abandoned. Fischer v. Lingle, 195 Neb. 108, 237 N.W.2d 110 (1975).
A mortgagor in a foreclosure proceeding is not entitled to personal service of the published notice of sale. Hollstein v. Adams, 187 Neb. 781, 194 N.W.2d 216 (1972).
Copy of notice, mailed hereunder, that a will and codicil are being offered for probate is sufficient to put party upon inquiry as to documents offered. Flint v. Panter, 187 Neb. 615, 193 N.W.2d 279 (1970).
This section does not apply to notice of dissolution of corporation. Christensen v. Boss, 179 Neb. 429, 138 N.W.2d 716 (1965).

The term action or proceeding means all actions and proceedings in any court and any action or proceeding before the governing bodies of municipal corporations, public corporations, and political subdivisions for the equalization of special assessments or assessing the cost of any public improvement.

Annotations

The act, of which this section is a part, is not amendatory, but is new and independent legislation. Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner, 175 Neb. 94, 120 N.W.2d 537 (1963).
Resolution of necessity for constructing a sewer system was not within purview of this section. Jones v. Village of Farnam, 174 Neb. 704, 119 N.W.2d 157 (1963).
Statute does not contemplate personal notice must be given to a class on matters of general public concern. Lindgren v. School Dist. of Bridgeport, 170 Neb. 279, 102 N.W.2d 599 (1960).

Sections 25-520.01 to 25-520.03 are intended by the Legislature to be cumulative and supplemental to existing legislation. They are deemed to be a matter of general statewide concern. Such sections apply to all parties authorized by law to give notice by publication, including the State of Nebraska, its governmental subdivisions, and all public and municipal corporations.

Annotations

The act, of which this section is a part, is not amendatory, but is new and independent legislation. Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner, 175 Neb. 94, 120 N.W.2d 537 (1963).

It shall be the lawful right of any plaintiff or petitioner in any suit, action or proceeding, pending or prosecuted in any of the courts of this state, in which it is necessary to publish in a newspaper any notice or copy of an order, growing out of, or connected with, such action or proceeding, either by himself or his attorney of record, to designate in what newspaper such notice or copy of order shall be published; and it shall be the duty of the judges of the district court, county judges, or any other officer charged with the duty of ordering, directing or superintending the publication of any of such notices, or copies of orders, to strictly comply with such designations when made in accordance with the provisions of this section.

No newspaper shall be considered a legal newspaper for the publication of legal and other official notices unless the same shall have a bona fide circulation of at least three hundred paid subscriptions weekly, and shall have been published within the county for fifty-two successive weeks prior to the publication of such notice, and be printed, either in whole or in part, in an office maintained at the place of publication; Provided, that nothing in this section shall invalidate the publication in a newspaper which has suspended publication or been printed outside of the county, on account of fire, flood or other unavoidable accident, for not to exceed ten weeks, in the year last preceding the first publication of a legal notice, advertising or publication; provided further, that all publications made prior to May 22, 1941, in a newspaper which has, on account of flood, fire or other unavoidable accident, suspended publication or been printed in an office outside of the county, are hereby legalized; provided further, that all newspapers, otherwise complying herewith, which have, on account of flood, fire or other unavoidable accident, suspended publication or been printed in an office outside of the county, for not to exceed ten weeks in any year, are hereby legalized; and provided further, that the publication of legal or other official notices in the English language in foreign language newspapers published within the county for fifty-two successive weeks prior to the publication of such a notice, and printed either in whole or in part in an office maintained at the place of publication, shall also be legal.

Annotations

Mechanical act of printing legal newspaper may be performed outside county of place of publication. Wymore Arbor State, Inc. v. Korinek, 182 Neb. 557, 156 N.W.2d 24 (1968).
Particular requirements of this section need not be recited in printer's proof of publication. Seymour v. Lawson, 111 Neb. 770, 197 N.W. 623 (1926).

A party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service than by publication in a newspaper may, at any time within five years after the date of entry of the judgment or order, have the same opened to allow the applicant to appear in court and make a defense. Before the judgment or order is opened, the applicant shall give notice to the adverse party of the intention to make such application and shall file a full answer to the petition or complaint, pay all costs, if the court requires them to be paid, and make it appear to the satisfaction of the court, by affidavit, that during the pendency of the action the applicant had no actual notice thereof in time to appear in court and make a defense. The title to any property, the subject of the judgment or order sought to be opened, which by it, or in consequence of it, has passed to a purchaser in good faith, shall not be affected by any proceedings under this section, nor shall the proceedings affect the title of any property sold before judgment under an attachment. The adverse party, on the hearing of an application to open a judgment or order, as provided by this section, shall be allowed to present counter-affidavits, to show that during the pendency of the action the applicant had notice thereof in time to appear in court and make a defense.

Annotations

1. Sufficiency of application

2. Notice to plaintiff

3. Title to conveyed property

4. Miscellaneous

1. Sufficiency of application

Before party can have judgment opened, it must appear that he had no actual notice of the pendency of the action in time to make defense. McNally v. McNally, 152 Neb. 845, 43 N.W.2d 170 (1950).
Verified petition filed by parties seeking to open up judgment under this section was equivalent to affidavit and answer required thereunder. Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N.W. 640 (1925).
Application was sufficient to authorize vacation of judgment. Eno v. Lampshire, 108 Neb. 265, 187 N.W. 782 (1922).
Ordinarily only party can make affidavit, but may be made by attorney where party is nonresident. Cass v. Nitsch, 81 Neb. 228, 115 N.W. 753 (1908).
On application, defendant cannot contest sufficiency of original petition; "full answer" means meritorious answer. Oakes v. Ziemer, 62 Neb. 603, 87 N.W. 350 (1901).
To permit a defendant to open up decree, full answer to the merits must be presented. Oakes v. Ziemer, 61 Neb. 6, 84 N.W. 409 (1900).
Defendant must show he did not have actual notice of suit in time to make defense; adverse party may present counteraffidavits. Stover v. Hough, 47 Neb. 789, 66 N.W. 825 (1896).
Party seeking to have judgment opened up must allege and prove bona fides. McGregor v. Eastern B. & L. Assn., 5 Neb. Unof. 563, 99 N.W. 509 (1904).
Motion to vacate judgment after term must tender valid defense which court will adjudge prima facie valid. Waters v. Raker, 1 Neb. Unof. 830, 96 N.W. 78 (1901).

2. Notice to plaintiff

Appearance by party to resist motion to vacate waives notice. Scarborough v. Myrick, 47 Neb. 794, 66 N.W. 867 (1896).
Proceeding is continuation of original action; service of notice on plaintiff's attorney is sufficient. Merriam v. Gordon, 17 Neb. 325, 22 N.W. 563 (1885).

3. Title to conveyed property

Good faith purchaser of land at judicial sale is protected in event judgment reversed under this section. Pauley v. Knouse, 109 Neb. 716, 192 N.W. 195 (1923); Warren v. Dick, 17 Neb. 241, 22 N.W. 462 (1885).
Title of purchaser cannot be litigated in action, except perhaps where bad faith is charged. Security Abstract of Title Co. v. Longacre, 56 Neb. 469, 76 N.W. 1073 (1898).
A purchaser of land under a judgment subsequently opened is not a purchaser pendente lite. Scudder v. Sargent, 15 Neb. 102, 17 N.W. 369 (1883).

4. Miscellaneous

One seeking to open up a judgment secured by constructive service must act within five years and must, by a preponderance of the evidence, show that he had no notice prior to judgment and he must file a meritorious answer. Wittwer v. Dorland, 198 Neb. 361, 253 N.W.2d 26 (1977).
This section has no relation to filing of claims against estate. Supp v. Allard, 162 Neb. 563, 76 N.W.2d 459 (1956).
This section has no reference to a void judgment. Hassett v. Durbin, 132 Neb. 315, 271 N.W. 867 (1937).
Action to redeem from tax foreclosure was commenced in time hereunder. Walter v. Union R. E. Co., 107 Neb. 144, 185 N.W. 323 (1921).
Section is not applicable to proceedings before drainage district board. Richardson County ex rel. Sheehan v. Drainage Dist., 96 Neb. 169, 147 N.W. 205 (1914).
Relief may be granted after five years if proper petitions are presented before expiration of time. Affidavits are amendable. Rine v. Rine, 91 Neb. 248, 135 N.W. 1051 (1912).
Section does not relate to void judgments. Herman v. Barth, 85 Neb. 722, 124 N.W. 135 (1910); Hayes County v. Wileman, 82 Neb. 669, 118 N.W. 478 (1908).
Owner of land sold under scavenger tax law is not entitled to benefits of this section as matter of right. State v. Several Parcels of Land, 75 Neb. 538, 106 N.W. 663 (1906).
Defendant who conveyed his interest by quitclaim deed cannot move to vacate judgment. Browne v. Palmer, 66 Neb. 287, 92 N.W. 315 (1902).
Acknowledgment on summons is actual personal service; judgment cannot be opened. Cheney v. Harding, 21 Neb. 65, 31 N.W. 255 (1887).
Affidavit by an attorney who has personal knowledge of the want of "actual notice" will be sufficient to open the judgment in absence of counteraffidavits. In re Reed v. Estate of Thompson, 19 Neb. 397, 27 N.W. 391 (1886).
Opening judgment upon complying with the requirements of the statute is a matter of right. Brown v. Conger, 10 Neb. 236, 4 N.W. 1009 (1880).

Where the action is against two or more defendants, and one or more shall have been served, but not all of them, the plaintiff may proceed as follows: (1) If the action be against defendants jointly indebted upon contract, he may proceed against the defendant served, unless the court otherwise direct; (2) if the action be against defendants severally liable, he may, without prejudice to his rights against those not served, proceed against the defendants served in the same manner as if they were the only defendants.

Annotations

Action being for joint and several liability, it could proceed as to the defendants served, under this section. Bourne v. Baer, 107 Neb. 255, 185 N.W. 408 (1921).
Section is applicable to proceedings to revive joint judgment. Thornhill v. Hargreaves, 76 Neb. 582, 107 N.W. 847 (1906); Clark v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Columbus, 68 Neb. 764, 94 N.W. 958 (1903).
Where principal on injunction bond could not be found in county, it was proper to proceed against surety alone. Gyger v. Courtney, 59 Neb. 555, 81 N.W. 437 (1900).
Obligors on joint bond must be joined; may proceed against those served. Perkins County v. Miller, 55 Neb. 141, 75 N.W. 577 (1898); Young v. Joseph Bros. & Davidson, 5 Neb. Unof. 559, 99 N.W. 522 (1904).

It shall be lawful for any person, association or corporation, owning or claiming any interest in or lien upon any real estate lying within this state, to make and file in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which such real estate is situated an appointment, in writing, of some person, who shall be a resident of the county in which said lands lie, upon whom process may be served in any suit, action or proceeding, concerning or affecting such real estate, to which such owner or claimant shall be made a party. Such appointment shall be acknowledged in the manner provided by law for the acknowledgment of deeds, and shall specifically describe the lands affected by such appointment. From and after the filing of such appointment as herein provided, service of any writ, summons, order or notice, in any suit, action or proceeding, concerning or affecting such real estate, shall be made upon the person so appointed and designated in such manner as may be provided by law for the service of process upon persons found in this state, and shall be held and taken to be a valid and effectual service upon such owner or claimant. A copy of such appointment, or of the record thereof, duly certified by the said register of deeds, shall be deemed sufficient evidence thereof. No service made by publication shall be valid in respect to any such owner or claimant, who shall have filed an appointment under the provisions of this article; Provided, such appointment may be at any time revoked by such owner or claimant, but such revocation shall be in writing duly acknowledged, and shall specifically describe the lands affected by such appointment, and filed and recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which any such real property is situated.

The register of deeds of each county shall record such appointment as shall be filed under the provisions of section 25-528 and any revocation thereof in the Miscellaneous Record, shall enter such instruments in the numerical index against the lands described therein, and shall be entitled to demand and receive fees as provided in section 33-109.

When a company, firm, or unincorporated association described in section 25-313 has its principal place of business or activity outside of this state and does not have a usual place of doing business or activity within the state or a clerk or general agent within the state, such company, firm, or unincorporated association shall appoint an agent or agents in this state, and before it is authorized to engage in any kind of business or activity in this state, such company, firm, or unincorporated association shall file in the office of the Secretary of State a certified statement setting forth that such company, firm, or unincorporated association is doing business or conducting activities in the State of Nebraska, stating the nature of the business or activity, and designating an agent or agents within the State of Nebraska upon whom process or other legal notice of the commencement of any legal proceeding or in the prosecution thereof may be served. Executions issued on any judgments rendered in such proceedings shall be levied only on property of the company, firm, or unincorporated association. A fee of five dollars shall be paid for filing the certified statement with the Secretary of State. If there is a change of the agent or agents or if there is a change of street address, a statement shall be filed with the Secretary of State stating the name of the new agent or agents or the new street address or both. A filing fee of three dollars shall be paid for the filing of such statement. This section shall not apply to domestic limited partnerships and foreign limited partnerships governed by the Nebraska Uniform Limited Partnership Act.

Cross References

Nebraska Uniform Limited Partnership Act, see section 67-296.

Annotations

1. Right to serve

2. Procedure

3. Miscellaneous

1. Right to serve

An unincorporated association to represent employees in collective bargaining must comply with this section before it may bring an action in court. Nebraska Council of Educational Leaders v. Nebraska Dept. of Education, 189 Neb. 811, 205 N.W.2d 537 (1973).
Prior to 1947 amendment, where unincorporated association was not formed to carry on some trade or business, or to hold some species of property in this state, service of process could not be properly made on such association in this state. Hurley v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 147 Neb. 781, 25 N.W.2d 29 (1946).
Nonresident firm of attorneys, not having office in this state, was not subject to service of process under this section. State ex rel. Johnson v. Tautges, Rerat & Welch, 146 Neb. 439, 20 N.W.2d 232 (1945).
Where the members of a partnership reside in another state and are not within this state, service of summons upon the firm cannot be made in a county where it has no usual place of business. Stelling v. Peddicord, 78 Neb. 779, 111 N.W. 793 (1907).
To authorize summons to another county, nonresident must be bona fide defendant. Stull Bros. v. Powell, 70 Neb. 152, 97 N.W. 249 (1903).
Section is cumulative, and does not prevent service on individual members of partnership. Herron v. Cole Bros., 25 Neb. 692, 41 N.W. 765 (1889).
In suit to enjoin violation of federal statute by members of partnership, federal district court for Missouri, wherein members resided, had jurisdiction although place of partnership's business was in Nebraska. Sutherland v. United States, 74 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1934).

2. Procedure

Defendant having given other reasons for refusing to recognize plaintiff as negotiating agent could not change ground after litigation started and base refusal on tardy filing of certificate designating agent. Orleans Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Orleans, 193 Neb. 675, 229 N.W.2d 172 (1975).
In suit against a partnership, filing of a petition by individual partners to remove suit to federal court is not a general appearance but a special appearance only. Security State Bank of Norfolk v. Jackson Bros., Boesel & Co., 130 Neb. 562, 265 N.W. 747 (1936).
Service in an action against a partnership may be made by copy left at the usual place of business. Wittstruck v. Temple, 58 Neb. 16, 78 N.W. 456 (1899).
Where action is brought against firm in the individual names of its members and one member is absent from state, service upon the others is sufficient. Winters v. Means, 25 Neb. 241, 41 N.W. 157 (1888).
Service on partnership at usual place of business is sufficient. Rosenbaum & Co. v. Hayden & Co., 22 Neb. 744, 36 N.W. 147 (1888).

3. Miscellaneous

Service of process in an action against individual members of a partnership is not governed by this section. Hanna v. Emerson, 45 Neb. 708, 64 N.W. 229 (1895).

When the summons has been served or publication made, the action is pending so as to charge third persons with notice of pendency. While the action is pending no interest can be acquired by third persons in the subject matter thereof, as against the plaintiff's title. In all actions brought to affect the title to real property, the plaintiff may either at the time of filing his or her complaint or afterwards, file, or in case any defendant sets up an affirmative cause of action and demands relief which shall affect the title to real estate, he or she may, at the time of filing such answer or at any time afterwards, file with the clerk or register of deeds of each county in which the real estate thus to be affected, or any part thereof, is situated, a notice of the pendency of such action. The notice shall contain the names of the parties, the object of the action, and a description of the property in such county sought to be affected thereby. If the action is for foreclosure of a mortgage, such notice shall contain the date of the mortgage, the parties thereto, and the time and place of recording the same. The clerk or register of deeds of such county shall record the notice thus filed and enter the same upon the numerical index of all lands, any part of which is included in the description in the notice, for which he or she shall be entitled to receive filing fees in accordance with section 33-109, to be paid by the person filing such notice, and which shall be taxed as part of the costs in the action. From the time of filing such notice the pendency of such action shall be constructive notice to any purchaser or encumbrancer to be affected thereby. Every person whose conveyance or encumbrance is subsequently executed or subsequently recorded shall be deemed to be a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer and shall be bound by all proceedings taken in the action after the filing of such notice to the same extent as if he or she were made a party to the action. The court in which such action was commenced or any judge thereof may at any time thereafter on the application of any person aggrieved, on good cause shown, and on such notice as the court or judge may determine, order the notice to be canceled by the clerk or register of deeds of any county in which the notice may have been filed or recorded by filing a notice of release. In actions in which such notice is filed in a county or counties, other than the county in which the action is pending, the county clerk or the register of deeds of the county in which the action was begun may cancel such notice by executing a written release under his or her hand and seal by reason of the order of the court or judge, and forward such release by mail to the county clerk or register of deeds of the county in which the notice has been filed or recorded, and which certificate such county clerk or register of deeds shall record in the records of his or her office. At any time after such notice of pendency is recorded, the party on whose behalf the same was filed or the party's attorney of record may cause the notice to be canceled in the office of the county clerk or register of deeds of any county in which the notice has been filed or recorded. Such cancellation may be made by written release in the same manner as such cancellations are entered on order of the court. For the service required by this section, the county clerk or register of deeds shall be entitled to charge and receive fees in accordance with section 33-109, to be paid by the party causing the service to be performed.

Annotations

1. Scope

2. Subsequent purchasers

3. Miscellaneous

1. Scope

The lis pendens statute is a specific statute that controls over section 25-323, which is the more general statute requiring the joinder of necessary and indispensable parties. Wilkinson Development v. Ford & Ford Investments, 311 Neb. 476, 973 N.W.2d 349 (2022).
The purpose and nature of the property and the intent of the parties determines whether buildings or other items located on leased land affect the title to real property. Ondrak v. Matis, 270 Neb. 46, 699 N.W.2d 367 (2005).
Lis pendens has no application to independent titles, not derived from any of the parties to the suit nor in succession to them. Coffin v. Old Line Life Ins. Co., 138 Neb. 857, 295 N.W. 884 (1941).
Claims based upon deed made after lis pendens is filed are subordinated to and determined by the judgment in mortgage foreclosure suit. Hadley v. Corey, 137 Neb. 204, 288 N.W. 826 (1939).
Notice of pendency of suit, while preventing other than parties to the suit from acquiring interest in subject matter pendente lite, does not affect existing rights or prevent the court from their adjudication. First Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Young, 124 Neb. 598, 247 N.W. 586 (1933).
In action to wind up farm lease partnership, intervening creditors of one partner, having constructive notice hereunder of their debtor's limited interest, must share with other partner in distribution of debtor's property. Sacks v. Lytle, 119 Neb. 642, 230 N.W. 501 (1930).
Filing lis pendens at commencement of quiet title action gives constructive notice of plaintiff's claims. Gwynne v. Goldware, 102 Neb. 260, 166 N.W. 625 (1918).
Filing lis pendens does not impound property for plaintiff not having general or specific lien. Purchaser after action is started is not bound by rights subsequently set up by amendment. Hulen v. Chilcoat, 79 Neb. 595, 113 N.W. 122 (1907).
Section does not refer to rights of third parties not derived through parties to suit. Merrill v. Wright, 65 Neb. 794, 91 N.W. 697 (1902).
Lessee under lease made during suit is subject to decree against lessor. McLean v. McCormick, 4 Neb. Unof. 187, 93 N.W. 697 (1903).
Lis pendens applies only to specific property pointed out by pleadings, and must be definite. Hillebrand v. Nelson, 1 Neb. Unof. 783, 95 N.W. 1068 (1901).
Nonresident assignee of note and mortgage, failing to record his assignment, is bound by decree canceling mortgage. Heck v. Nicholas, 6 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1925).

2. Subsequent purchasers

The lis pendens statute does not operate to prevent a subsequent purchaser from fully participating as a party in a quiet title action affecting the subject property. Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co., 297 Neb. 541, 900 N.W.2d 765 (2017).
The court having jurisdiction, a party cannot, while the action is pending, dispose of the property and avoid the effect of the final judgment in the case. Stanton v. Stanton, 146 Neb. 71, 18 N.W.2d 654 (1945).
A purchaser pendente lite need not be made a party to a mechanic's lien foreclosure proceeding. Johnson v. Olson, 132 Neb. 778, 273 N.W. 201 (1937).
One failing to record deed until after lis pendens filed in action to set aside deeds is subsequent purchaser and bound by proceedings. Justice v. Shaw, 103 Neb. 423, 172 N.W. 253 (1919).
Amendment of 1887 cutting off prior unrecorded interests was constitutional; purpose of amendment stated. Munger v. Beard & Bro., 79 Neb. 764, 113 N.W. 214 (1907).
Mortgagee acquiring rights after levy of attachment took subject thereto even though petition in attachment suit was thereafter amended. Nagle v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 57 Neb. 552, 77 N.W. 1074 (1899).
Purchaser pendente lite is bound by decree. Clark v. Charles, 55 Neb. 202, 75 N.W. 563 (1898); Lincoln Rapid Transit Co. v. Rundle, 34 Neb. 559, 52 N.W. 563 (1892).
Judgment is superior to mortgage executed during term, though recorded before judgment. Norfolk State Bank v. Murphy, 40 Neb. 735, 59 N.W. 706 (1894).
Purchaser after summons served is subject to judgment. Shuman v. Willets, 17 Neb. 478, 23 N.W. 358 (1885).

3. Miscellaneous

The perceived merits of the underlying action are not "good cause" to cancel a notice of lis pendens under this section. Kelliher v. Soundy, 288 Neb. 898, 852 N.W.2d 718 (2014).

When any part of the real property, the subject matter of an action, is situated in any other county or counties than the one in which the action is brought, a certified copy of the judgment in such action must be recorded in the clerk's office of such other county or counties before it shall operate therein as a notice, so as to charge third persons as provided in section 25-531. It shall operate as such notice without record in the county where it is rendered; but this section shall not apply to actions or proceedings under any statute now in force which does not require such record.

No levy of attachment or execution on real estate issued from any other county shall be notice to a subsequent vendee or encumbrancer in good faith, unless the sheriff has filed a notice on the record that the land, describing it, has been so attached or levied on, the cause in which it was so attached, and when it was done.

Whenever in any action or proceeding, any order, motion, notice, or other document, except a summons, is required by statute or rule of the Supreme Court to be served upon or given to any party, the service or delivery shall be made in accordance with the rules of pleading in civil actions promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to section 25-801.01.

Annotations

This section did not apply when the defendant in a paternity action did not appear in the action. State v. Buckhalter, 273 Neb. 443, 730 N.W.2d 340 (2007).
Service of agency's final decision was completed upon mailing pursuant to this section rather than upon receipt of decision by petitioner's attorney. Roubal v. State, 14 Neb. App. 554, 710 N.W.2d 359 (2006).
Notice was satisfied when address used was correct but included wrong office designation and no evidence showed notice was not received. City of Lincoln v. MJM, Inc., 9 Neb. App. 715, 618 N.W.2d 710 (2000).

As used in sections 25-535 to 25-541, person includes an individual, executor, administrator, personal representative, corporation, partnership, limited liability company, association, or other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this state and whether or not organized under the laws of this state.

Annotations

Under this and succeeding sections where copies of complaint, summons, and interrogatories were sent by registered mail to limited partnership defendant at its foreign office, Nebraska long-arm statute was satisfied. Blum v. Kawaguchi, Ltd., 331 F.Supp. 216 (D. Neb. 1971).

(1) Who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person:

(d) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if the person regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state;

(f) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting; or

(2) Who has any other contact with or maintains any other relation to this state to afford a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the Constitution of the United States.

Cross References

Resident agent appointment in real estate matters, see section 25-528.
Service on foreign corporations, registered agent, see sections 21-19,152 and 21-19,155.
Service on foreign insurance corporations, see sections 44-135, 44-2009 to 44-2013, and 44-5507.
Workers' compensation cases, additional method of jurisdiction exists, see sections 48-146, 48-175, 48-175.01, and 48-190.

Annotations

1. Scope of jurisdiction

2. Subject to jurisdiction

3. Not subject to jurisdiction

4. Miscellaneous

1. Scope of jurisdiction

Nebraska's long-arm statute extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. It was the intention of the Legislature to provide for the broadest allowable jurisdiction over nonresidents under Nebraska's long-arm statute, and when a state construes its long-arm statute to confer jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally permitted, the inquiry collapses into the single question of whether jurisdiction comports with due process. Yeransian v. Willkie Farr, 305 Neb. 693, 942 N.W.2d 226 (2020).
Nebraska's long-arm statute extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Thus, courts need only look to the Due Process Clause when determining personal jurisdiction. Lanham v. BNSF Railway Co., 305 Neb. 124, 939 N.W.2d 363 (2020).
If a Nebraska court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, it is authorized by subsection (2) of this section. Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions v. Lone Star Steakhouse, 298 Neb. 705, 905 N.W.2d 644 (2018).
Nebraska's long-arm statute extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. S.L. v. Steven L., 274 Neb. 646, 742 N.W.2d 734 (2007); Ameritas Invest. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005); Brunkhardt v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 269 Neb. 222, 691 N.W.2d 147 (2005); Quality Pork Internat. v. Rupari Food Servs., 267 Neb. 474, 675 N.W.2d 642 (2004).
Nebraska's long-arm statute is to be interpreted broadly in view of the rationale and philosophy underlying its adoption. Quality Pork Internat. v. Rupari Food Servs., 267 Neb. 474, 675 N.W.2d 642 (2004).
Concept of due process in Nebraska's long-arm statute is at least as broad as the constitutional standard of due process. Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Gelt, 558 F.2d 1303 (8th Cir. 1977).
Nebraska long-arm statute is limited only by the constitutional constraints imposed by the minimum contacts rule. Vergara v. Aeroflot Soviet Airlines, 390 F.Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975).

2. Subject to jurisdiction

Nebraska's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over a noncustodial parent who removes a minor child from the child's Nebraska home under the guise of exercising visitation rights in another jurisdiction and then intentionally subjects the child to harm before returning her to this state. S.L. v. Steven L., 274 Neb. 646, 742 N.W.2d 734 (2007).
A parent company had sufficient minimum contacts with Nebraska for a Nebraska court to exercise personal jurisdiction where the parent company contracted with its Nebraska subsidiary, coordinated the exchange of equipment between the subsidiary and other centers, prepared all tax reports, provided all forms necessary for operations in Nebraska, and operated a toll-free telephone number and Website accessible from Nebraska. Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., 274 Neb. 236, 738 N.W.2d 453 (2007).
This section expressly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Crete Carrier Corp. v. Red Food Stores, Inc., 254 Neb. 323, 576 N.W.2d 760 (1998).
This section expressly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. The fiduciary shield doctrine is not a bar to personal jurisdiction over a corporate agent or employee when the agent or employee has sufficient minimum contacts of his own with Nebraska to satisfy federal due process requirements. Crystal Clear Optical v. Silver, 247 Neb. 981, 531 N.W.2d 535 (1995).
This section explicitly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Wagner v. Unicord Corp., 247 Neb. 217, 526 N.W.2d 74 (1995).
Nonresident defendant's conduct and connection with the State of Nebraska was such that it reasonably should have anticipated being haled into court over plaintiff's cause of action for the return of its loan application fee. 24th and Dodge Ltd. v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 243 Neb. 98, 497 N.W.2d 386 (1993).
In order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if the defendant is not within the territory of the forum, due process requires that such defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. McGowan Grain v. Sanburg, 225 Neb. 129, 403 N.W.2d 340 (1987).
The establishment of a marital relationship in this state from which a nonresident has left is sufficient minimum contact with this state to permit a court of this state to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident in an action to dissolve that marriage. York v. York, 219 Neb. 883, 367 N.W.2d 133 (1985).
Company having an interest in, using or possessing real property in this state at a time when it was transacting business in this state was subject to jurisdiction of court in this state and its special appearance was properly overruled. Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Development Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974).
Nonresident manufacturer comes under long-arm statute when it places its products in the stream of commerce expecting delivery in Nebraska. Stoehr v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 429 F.Supp. 763 (D. Neb. 1977).
By statute, defendant is under state jurisdiction when defendant contracts for sale of motorcycles in Nebraska. Hetrick v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 429 F.Supp. 116 (D. Neb. 1976).
Where after defendant Illinois corporation entered into distributorship agreement for Nebraska, area contacts were numerous and continuous. Nebraska corporation's antitrust cause of action arose out of interrelated acts allegedly indicating unfair competition; sufficient contacts existed to permit in personam jurisdiction. Morton Buildings of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Buildings, Inc., 333 F.Supp. 187 (D. Neb. 1971).
Where the delivery, installation, operation, and alleged injury resulting from defective machine occurred in Nebraska, the manufacturer who had shipped same indirectly was subject to Nebraska jurisdiction. Blum v. Kawaguchi, Ltd., 331 F.Supp. 216 (D. Neb. 1971).

3. Not subject to jurisdiction

A Nebraska-based client will not provide a sufficient basis for specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident attorney absent the solicitation of Nebraska-based clients or something else linking the attorney to the state. Central States Dev. v. Friedgut, 312 Neb. 909, 981 N.W.2d 573 (2022).
Nebraska courts lacked personal jurisdiction over a nonresident attorney and out-of-state law firm where the attorney sought a federal agency's approval of a federal program for a Nebraska-based client. Central States Dev. v. Friedgut, 312 Neb. 909, 981 N.W.2d 573 (2022).
Neither an act of sexual intercourse between consenting adults nor the failure of a putative father to support his child is an act "causing tortious injury" under the terms of the Nebraska long-arm statute. State ex rel. Larimore v. Snyder, 206 Neb. 64, 291 N.W.2d 241 (1980).
For tortious act in other state, jurisdiction for damage action in Nebraska not supported by telephone calls, travel to Nebraska, and unspecified acts which induced victim to travel to other state. Von Seggern v. Saikin, 187 Neb. 315, 189 N.W.2d 512 (1971).
An ongoing relationship, by itself, is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. The quality and nature of the ongoing business relationship is important, not just the fact that a business relationship exists. Roth Grading v. Martin Bros. Constr., 25 Neb. App. 928, 916 N.W.2d 70 (2018).
The existence of a contract with a party in a forum state or the mere use of interstate facilities, such as telephones and mail, does not, in and of itself, provide the necessary contacts for personal jurisdiction. Roth Grading v. Martin Bros. Constr., 25 Neb. App. 928, 916 N.W.2d 70 (2018).
Nebraska courts lacked personal jurisdiction over a wife to adjudicate personal matters that were incidences of the parties' marriage, such as child custody, parenting time, child support, and division of property and debts, where the wife and children never had contact with Nebraska, and the parties were married, had children, and separated in Canada. Metzler v. Metzler, 25 Neb. App. 757, 913 N.W.2d 733 (2018).
Where defendants maintained no offices, salespersons, or agents in Nebraska; where contracts neither executed nor performed in Nebraska; where goods neither came from or to Nebraska; the Nebraska contracts insufficient to attach jurisdiction under long-arm statutes. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1977) affirming, Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1977).
National Trailer Leasing Company under facts of case not subject to jurisdiction under this section which requires actual presence in state plus additional requirement of regular or persistent course of conduct. Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1969).
Where the activities of a physician and hospital in administering chemotherapy treatment were localized and confined to the State of Iowa, there were insufficient contacts with Nebraska for purposes of application of the Nebraska long-arm statute in a wrongful death action against the physician and hospital, notwithstanding the foreseeability of alleged effects occurring in Nebraska where the patient resided. Glover v. Wagner, 462 F.Supp. 308 (D. Neb. 1978).
Where purchase contracts were executed outside Nebraska by nonresident sellers for shipment of goods to other states, and defendants did not transact nor solicit business in Nebraska, buyers' Nebraska residence did not give federal court in Nebraska personal jurisdiction in this suit under Bankruptcy Act. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 418 F.Supp. 674 (D. Neb. 1976).

4. Miscellaneous

The provisions of this section requiring notice of homestead exemption rights do not apply to foreclosure of a tax lien represented by a tax sale certificate. Destiny 98 TD v. Miodowski, 269 Neb. 427, 693 N.W.2d 278 (2005).
The benchmark for determining if the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process is whether the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. The existence of a Nebraska choice-of-law clause is a factor to be considered in determining whether a party should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Nebraska. Castle Rose v. Philadelphia Bar & Grill of Arizona, Inc., 254 Neb. 299, 576 N.W.2d 192 (1998).
While language of this section does not cover divorce in specific words, it indicates the legislative intention to apply the minimum contacts rule where it does not offend traditional concepts of fair play and substantial justice. Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971).
To determine whether a defendant's contract supplies the contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction in a forum state, a court is to consider the parties' prior negotiations and future contemplated consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing. Roth Grading v. Martin Bros. Constr., 25 Neb. App. 928, 916 N.W.2d 70 (2018).
Out-of-state seller, who allegedly sold heifers to a cow-calf operation that were unfit for breeding purposes, did not have continuous and systematic business contact with Nebraska sufficient to warrant the exercise of personal general jurisdiction over seller. There was no evidence that seller designated an agent for service of process, held a license in the state, had employees in the state, or was incorporated in the state. South Dakota cattle seller's sending industry directories, in which it had placed advertisements to buyer, and maintaining 800 number, was not purposeful availment to the laws of Nebraska, as was required to warrant exercise of specific jurisdiction over seller in buyers' action alleging that seller breached warranty that heifers were fit for breeding purposes. Higgins v. Rausch Herefords, 9 Neb. App. 212, 609 N.W.2d 712 (2000).
Question of whether in personam jurisdiction is acquired under Nebraska long-arm statute depends primarily on the quantity, nature, and quality of the parties' contacts with the forum state. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1977).
It is a nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state that are of interest in determining if in personam jurisdiction exists, not its contacts with the resident plaintiff. Gendler v. General Growth Properties, 461 F.Supp. 434 (D. Neb. 1978).
Under facts in this case, defendant was amenable to service, and when copy of complaint and a summons were served by registered mail with signed receipt required, requirements of due process were met. General Leisure Products Corp. v. Gleason Corp., 331 F.Supp. 278 (D. Neb. 1971).

When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by sections 25-535 to 25-541, service may be made outside this state.

Annotations

Unless defendant transacts some business in Nebraska, jurisdiction over him may not be obtained hereunder by service outside the state. Conner v. Southern, 186 Neb. 164, 181 N.W.2d 446 (1970).
Concept of due process in Nebraska's long-arm statute is at least as broad as the constitutional standard of due process. Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Gelt, 558 F.2d 1303 (8th Cir. 1977).

When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.

Annotations

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss case on basis of forum non conveniens. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Kight, 246 Neb. 619, 522 N.W.2d 155 (1994).
The district court considered the public interest factors of forum non conveniens and dismissed the plaintiff's action, concluding that New York was a better forum. However, the district court failed to also consider the unique circumstances of the case, namely, that a New York court had already dismissed the plaintiff's case because it determined that the case should be heard in Nebraska pursuant to a forum selection clause in the parties' contract; the New York court did not address the public interest factors of forum non conveniens in its decision. Given the unique circumstances, rather than dismissing the action, the district court should have stayed the action on the condition that the case is filed in and accepted by the New York courts. Milmar Food Group II v. Applied Underwriters, 29 Neb. App. 714, 958 N.W.2d 920 (2021).
Where diverse parties to a contract have agreed in writing that the defendant will assume the burden of litigating an action on the contract in the plaintiff's home jurisdiction, and where there is no evidence of fraud or duress or any other action by the plaintiff that would retroactively render void the contractual forum selection, this section does not authorize a court to arbitrarily amend the contract by nullifying the forum selection clause and reassigning to the plaintiff the burden of litigating an action on the contract in a foreign jurisdiction. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Walker, 1 Neb. App. 882, 510 N.W.2d 439 (1993).

A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any other basis authorized by law.

Annotations

In personam jurisdiction may be acquired over a nonresident defendant in a divorce action by extra-territorial personal service of process made in accordance with a statute of this state if there exists sufficient contacts between the defendant and this state relevant to the cause of action to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantive justice. In this case, defendant's last marital domicile was in Nebraska and no showing was made that it was later superseded by a new domicile. Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971).

(1) When the law of this state authorizes service outside this state, the service, when reasonably calculated to give actual notice, may be made:

(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is made for service in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction;

(2) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the individual who made the service or in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place in which the service is made for proof of service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction.

Cross References

Workers' compensation cases, additional nonresident jurisdiction and method of proof of service exists, see section 48-175.01.

Annotations

When service of process is made outside of the state by mail, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of personal delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court. Lydick v. Smith, 201 Neb. 45, 266 N.W.2d 208 (1978).
Proof of service by mail must include a receipt signed by the addressee, or other satisfactory evidence of personal delivery, and an affidavit to be considered on appeal must be offered in evidence and preserved in the bill of exceptions. Anderson v. Autocrat Corp., 194 Neb. 278, 231 N.W.2d 560 (1975).
Where affidavit showed service personally upon defendant Reiff individually and as district manager of defendant corporation, and by certified mail, return receipt requested upon individual defendants in their office in Morton, Illinois, together with return receipts showing that copies of summons and complaint were served upon each, the process was in conformity with this section. Morton Buildings of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Buildings, Inc., 333 F.Supp. 187 (D. Neb. 1971).

Sections 25-535 to 25-541 do not repeal or modify any other law of this state permitting another procedure for service.

Unless specifically provided to the contrary or the context otherwise requires, the provisions of Chapter 25, article 5, on service of process, as such provisions may from time to time be amended, shall apply to all civil proceedings in all courts of this state and to all proceedings under any statute which refers to or incorporates the general provisions on process or service of process.